FKIE_CVE-2025-57801
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-08-22 20:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:43
Severity
Summary
gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "gnark",
"vendor": "Consensys",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.14.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CBDC4D7B-90D9-4551-889C-E82C0B2CD6E9",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.14.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 \u2264 S \u003c order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark\u2019s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "gnark es un framework de sistemas a prueba de conocimiento cero. En versiones anteriores a la 0.14.0, la funci\u00f3n Verificar de eddsa.go y ecdsa.go utilizaba el valor S de una firma sin afirmar que 0 ? S \u0026lt; orden, lo que generaba una vulnerabilidad de maleabilidad de firma. Dado que los circuitos EdDSA y ECDSA nativos de Gnark carecen de restricciones esenciales, varios testigos distintos pueden satisfacer las mismas entradas p\u00fablicas. En protocolos donde los anuladores o las comprobaciones antirrepetici\u00f3n se derivan de R y S, esto permite la maleabilidad de firma y puede permitir el doble gasto. Este problema se ha solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.14.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-57801",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:43:27.693",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-57801",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-08-22T20:05:45.827084Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-08-22T20:15:33.080",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/0ba6730f05537a351517998add89a61a0d82716e"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/security/advisories/GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.