FKIE_CVE-2025-56498
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-03 16:15 - Updated: 2026-11-07 18:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cve@mitre.org | https://github.com/Jorge2Rubio/CVEs/blob/main/CVE-2025-56498.md | Exploit, Third Party Advisory | |
| cve@mitre.org | https://prolink2u.com/products/pgn6401v | Product |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| prolink2u | pgn6401v_firmware | * | |
| prolink2u | pgn6401v | - |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:prolink2u:pgn6401v_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "49A20746-3F84-4D44-8947-3E2CA43E0BCA",
"versionEndIncluding": "8.1.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
},
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:prolink2u:pgn6401v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E1580878-C7D7-47AC-BFA3-2B90035F38D4",
"vulnerable": false
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in PLDT WiFi Router\u0027s Prolink PGN6401V Firmware 8.1.2 web management interface. The ping6.asp page submits user input to the /boaform/formPing6 endpoint via the pingAddr parameter, which is not properly sanitized. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw by injecting arbitrary system commands, which are executed by the underlying operating system with root privileges. The router uses the Boa web server (version 0.93.15) to handle the request. Successful exploitation can lead to full system compromise and unauthorized control of the network device."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Existe una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n de comandos del sistema operativo en la interfaz de gesti\u00f3n web del firmware 8.1.2 de Prolink PGN6401V del router WiFi PLDT. La p\u00e1gina ping6.asp env\u00eda la entrada del usuario al endpoint /boaform/formPing6 a trav\u00e9s del par\u00e1metro pingAddr, que no se sanea correctamente. Un atacante autenticado puede explotar esta falla inyectando comandos de sistema arbitrarios, que son ejecutados por el sistema operativo subyacente con privilegios de root. El router utiliza el servidor web Boa (versi\u00f3n 0.93.15) para manejar la solicitud. La explotaci\u00f3n exitosa puede llevar a un compromiso total del sistema y a un control no autorizado del dispositivo de red."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-56498",
"lastModified": "2026-11-07T18:10:00.200",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-56498",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-09-03T20:01:33.019752Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-09-03T16:15:40.193",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Jorge2Rubio/CVEs/blob/main/CVE-2025-56498.md"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://prolink2u.com/products/pgn6401v"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-78"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.