FKIE_CVE-2025-55002
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-06 21:17 - Updated: 2026-11-11 05:19| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "jupyterlab-desktop",
"vendor": "jupyterlab",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.6.2-1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "JupyterLab Desktop is the cross-platform desktop application for JupyterLab. Prior to 4.6.2-1, JupyterLab Desktop for macOS shipped with Electron\u0027s RunAsNode fuse enabled, allowing ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE to execute arbitrary Node.js code in the application process. An attacker who can already execute code as the current user can therefore run code in JupyterLab Desktop\u0027s context and inherit TCC permissions previously granted to the application, including access to protected Documents, Desktop, or Downloads folders without another macOS prompt. Exploitation requires existing local code execution and prior TCC grants; it does not provide initial or remote code execution. Windows and Linux are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.2-1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "JupyterLab Desktop es la aplicaci\u00f3n de escritorio multiplataforma para JupyterLab. Versiones anteriores a la 4.6.2-1, JupyterLab Desktop para macOS se distribu\u00eda con el fusible RunAsNode de Electron habilitado, lo que permit\u00eda a ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE ejecutar c\u00f3digo Node.js arbitrario en el proceso de la aplicaci\u00f3n. Un atacante que ya puede ejecutar c\u00f3digo como el usuario actual puede, por lo tanto, ejecutar c\u00f3digo en el contexto de JupyterLab Desktop y heredar los permisos TCC previamente otorgados a la aplicaci\u00f3n, incluyendo el acceso a las carpetas protegidas de Documentos, Escritorio o Descargas sin otra solicitud de macOS. La explotaci\u00f3n requiere una ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo local existente y concesiones TCC previas; no proporciona ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo inicial o remota. Windows y Linux no se ven afectados. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 4.6.2-1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-55002",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T05:19:13.097",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-55002",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-11T03:29:38.969959Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-06T21:17:04.390",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-desktop/commit/5ea4bf3323b0b7acc943a867522819a7064bec38"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-desktop/releases/tag/v4.6.2-1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-desktop/security/advisories/GHSA-5c3f-5gj7-p9xh"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-94"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-250"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-693"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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