FKIE_CVE-2025-54469
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-30 10:15 - Updated: 2026-10-18 00:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "github.com/neuvector/neuvector",
"product": "neuvector",
"vendor": "SUSE",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5.3.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.3.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.4.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "0.0.0-20251020133207-084a437033b4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.0.0-20230727023453-1c4957d53911",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "meissner@suse.de"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A vulnerability was identified in NeuVector, where the enforcer used environment variables CLUSTER_RPC_PORT and CLUSTER_LAN_PORT to generate a command to be executed via popen, without first sanitising their values.\n\n\nThe entry process of the enforcer container is the monitor\n process. When the enforcer container stops, the monitor process checks \nwhether the consul subprocess has exited. To perform this check, the \nmonitor process uses the popen function to execute a shell command that determines whether the ports used by the consul subprocess are still active.\n\n\nThe values of environment variables CLUSTER_RPC_PORT and CLUSTER_LAN_PORT\n are used directly to compose shell commands via popen without \nvalidation or sanitization. This behavior could allow a malicious user \nto inject malicious commands through these variables within the enforcer\n container."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Se identific\u00f3 una vulnerabilidad en NeuVector, donde el enforcer us\u00f3 las variables de entorno CLUSTER_RPC_PORT y CLUSTER_LAN_PORT para generar un comando a ser ejecutado v\u00eda popen, sin sanitizar primero sus valores.\n\nEl proceso de entrada del contenedor del enforcer es el proceso monitor. Cuando el contenedor del enforcer se detiene, el proceso monitor verifica si el subproceso consul ha terminado. Para realizar esta verificaci\u00f3n, el proceso monitor usa la funci\u00f3n popen para ejecutar un comando de shell que determina si los puertos usados por el subproceso consul a\u00fan est\u00e1n activos.\n\nLos valores de las variables de entorno CLUSTER_RPC_PORT y CLUSTER_LAN_PORT son usados directamente para componer comandos de shell v\u00eda popen sin validaci\u00f3n o sanitizaci\u00f3n. Este comportamiento podr\u00eda permitir a un usuario malintencionado inyectar comandos maliciosos a trav\u00e9s de estas variables dentro del contenedor del enforcer."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-54469",
"lastModified": "2026-10-18T00:10:00.123",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.9,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "meissner@suse.de",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-54469",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-10-31T03:55:27.626032Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-10-30T10:15:34.980",
"references": [
{
"source": "meissner@suse.de",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2025-54469"
},
{
"source": "meissner@suse.de",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/security/advisories/GHSA-c8g6-qrwh-m3vp"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "meissner@suse.de",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-78"
}
],
"source": "meissner@suse.de",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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