FKIE_CVE-2025-53549
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-07-10 19:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:38| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "matrix-rust-sdk",
"vendor": "matrix-org",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.11, \u003c 0.13"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Matrix Rust SDK is a collection of libraries that make it easier to build Matrix clients in Rust. An SQL injection vulnerability in the EventCache::find_event_with_relations method of matrix-sdk 0.11 and 0.12 allows malicious room members to execute arbitrary SQL commands in Matrix clients that directly pass relation types provided by those room members into this method, when used with the default sqlite-based store backend. Exploitation is unlikely, as no known clients currently use the API in this manner. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.13."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "SDK Matrix de Rust es una colecci\u00f3n de librer\u00edas que facilita la creaci\u00f3n de clientes Matrix en Rust. Una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n SQL en el m\u00e9todo EventCache::find_event_with_relations de matrix-sdk 0.11 y 0.12 permite a miembros maliciosos de la sala ejecutar comandos SQL arbitrarios en clientes Matrix que transfieren directamente los tipos de relaci\u00f3n proporcionados por dichos miembros a este m\u00e9todo, al usarse con el backend de almacenamiento predeterminado basado en SQLite. Es improbable que se explote, ya que actualmente ning\u00fan cliente conocido utiliza la API de esta manera. Esta vulnerabilidad se corrigi\u00f3 en la versi\u00f3n 0.13."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-53549",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:38:25.760",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.2,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "UNREPORTED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-53549",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-07-10T19:02:17.517266Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-07-10T19:15:26.683",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/4849"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-275g-g844-73jh"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-89"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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