FKIE_CVE-2025-42611

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-05 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-07 09:10
Summary
RouterOS provides various services that rely on correct verification of client and server certificates to secure confidentiality and integrity of communications. This includes OpenVPN, CAPsMAN, Dot1x (802.1X), among others. The vulnerability lies in shared certificate validation logic which uses the system certificate store that is shared and equally trusted by all system services. This causes confusion of scope, allowing any certificate authority present in the system-wide trust store to be trusted in any context (with some exceptions), allowing partial or full authentication bypass in CAPsMAN, OpenVPN, Dot1X and potentially others.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "RouterOS",
          "vendor": "Mikrotik",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.20.x",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "RouterOS provides various services that rely on correct\nverification of client and server certificates to secure confidentiality and\nintegrity of communications. This includes OpenVPN, CAPsMAN, Dot1x (802.1X),\namong others.\n\n\n\nThe vulnerability lies in shared certificate validation\nlogic which uses the system certificate store that is shared and equally\ntrusted by all system services. This causes confusion of scope, allowing any\ncertificate authority present in the system-wide trust store to be trusted in\nany context (with some exceptions), allowing partial or full authentication\nbypass in CAPsMAN, OpenVPN, Dot1X and potentially others."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "RouterOS proporciona varios servicios que dependen de la verificaci\u00f3n correcta de certificados de cliente y servidor para asegurar la confidencialidad y la integridad de las comunicaciones. Esto incluye OpenVPN, CAPsMAN, Dot1x (802.1X), entre otros.\n\nLa vulnerabilidad reside en la l\u00f3gica compartida de validaci\u00f3n de certificados que utiliza el almac\u00e9n de certificados del sistema que es compartido y igualmente confiado por todos los servicios del sistema. Esto causa confusi\u00f3n de alcance, permitiendo que cualquier autoridad de certificaci\u00f3n presente en el almac\u00e9n de confianza de todo el sistema sea confiada en cualquier contexto (con algunas excepciones), permitiendo un bypass de autenticaci\u00f3n parcial o total en CAPsMAN, OpenVPN, Dot1X y potencialmente otros."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-42611",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-07T09:10:00.160",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 2.5,
        "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-42611",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-05T12:38:09.152163Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-05T11:16:31.827",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158",
      "url": "https://www.cert.si/en/cve-2025-42611/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-295"
        }
      ],
      "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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