FKIE_CVE-2025-40272

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-06 22:15 - Updated: 2026-10-15 22:19
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler When a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with `memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the underlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file mapping. If two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end up allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only one would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping. The task that failed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again and (b) putting the page back into the direct map. However, by doing these two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the allocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping. If another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the kernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a supervisor not-present page fault. Fix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e4643d6628edf9c0047b1f8f5bc574665025acb
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42d486d35a4143cc37fc72ee66edc99d942dd367
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4444767e625da46009fc94a453fd1967b80ba047
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52f2d5cf33de9a8f5e72bbb0ed38282ae0bc4649
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f86d0534fddfbd08687fa0f01479d4226bc3c3d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb1c19636aedae39360e6fdbcaef4f2bcff25785
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/secretmem.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "bb1c19636aedae39360e6fdbcaef4f2bcff25785",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "1e4643d6628edf9c0047b1f8f5bc574665025acb",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "42d486d35a4143cc37fc72ee66edc99d942dd367",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "52f2d5cf33de9a8f5e72bbb0ed38282ae0bc4649",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4444767e625da46009fc94a453fd1967b80ba047",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6f86d0534fddfbd08687fa0f01479d4226bc3c3d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/secretmem.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.197",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.159",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.117",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.59",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.17.9",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler\n\nWhen a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with\n`memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the\nunderlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file\nmapping.\n\nIf two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end\nup allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only\none would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping.  The task that\nfailed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again\nand (b) putting the page back into the direct map.  However, by doing\nthese two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the\nallocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping.\n\nIf another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the\nkernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a\nsupervisor not-present page fault.\n\nFix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad:\n\nmm/secretmem: corregir carrera de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n en el controlador de fallos\n\nCuando ocurre una falla de p\u00e1gina en un archivo de memoria secreta creado con \u0027memfd_secret(2)\u0027, el kernel asignar\u00e1 un nuevo folio para ella, marcar\u00e1 la p\u00e1gina subyacente como no presente en el mapa directo y la a\u00f1adir\u00e1 al mapeo del archivo.\n\nSi dos tareas provocan una falla en la misma p\u00e1gina simult\u00e1neamente, ambas podr\u00edan terminar asignando un folio y retirando la p\u00e1gina del mapa directo, pero solo una lograr\u00e1 a\u00f1adir el folio al mapeo del archivo. La tarea que falla revierte los efectos de su intento (a) liberando el folio nuevamente y (b) devolviendo la p\u00e1gina al mapa directo. Sin embargo, al realizar estas dos operaciones en ese orden, la p\u00e1gina vuelve a estar disponible para el asignador antes de que se vuelva a colocar en el mapa directo.\n\nSi otra tarea intenta asignar la p\u00e1gina entre (a) y (b), y el kernel intenta acceder a ella a trav\u00e9s del mapa directo, se producir\u00eda una falla de p\u00e1gina no presente del supervisor.\n\nCorregir el orden para restaurar el mapa directo antes de liberar el folio."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-40272",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-15T22:19:06.473",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-40272",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:58:37.467202Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-12-06T22:15:54.887",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e4643d6628edf9c0047b1f8f5bc574665025acb"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42d486d35a4143cc37fc72ee66edc99d942dd367"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4444767e625da46009fc94a453fd1967b80ba047"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52f2d5cf33de9a8f5e72bbb0ed38282ae0bc4649"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f86d0534fddfbd08687fa0f01479d4226bc3c3d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb1c19636aedae39360e6fdbcaef4f2bcff25785"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}



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