FKIE_CVE-2025-40189
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-12 22:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a72a7c4f675080a324d4c2167bd2314d968279f1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8b1b2ca83b200fa46fdfb81e80ad5fe34537e6d4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "49bdb63ff64469a6de8ea901aef123c75be9bbe7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8b1b2ca83b200fa46fdfb81e80ad5fe34537e6d4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: lan78xx: Fix lost EEPROM read timeout error(-ETIMEDOUT) in lan78xx_read_raw_eeprom\n\nSyzbot reported read of uninitialized variable BUG with following call stack.\n\nlan78xx 8-1:1.0 (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): EEPROM read operation timeout\n=====================================================\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1095 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in lan78xx_reset+0x999/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1095 [inline]\n lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\n lan78xx_reset+0x999/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_bind+0x711/0x1690 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3766\n lan78xx_probe+0x225c/0x3310 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:4707\n\nLocal variable sig.i.i created at:\n lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1092 [inline]\n lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\n lan78xx_reset+0x77e/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_bind+0x711/0x1690 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3766\n\nThe function lan78xx_read_raw_eeprom failed to properly propagate EEPROM\nread timeout errors (-ETIMEDOUT). In the fallthrough path, it first\nattempted to restore the pin configuration for LED outputs and then\nreturned only the status of that restore operation, discarding the\noriginal timeout error.\n\nAs a result, callers could mistakenly treat the data buffer as valid\neven though the EEPROM read had actually timed out with no data or partial\ndata.\n\nTo fix this, handle errors in restoring the LED pin configuration separately.\nIf the restore succeeds, return any prior EEPROM timeout error correctly\nto the caller."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nnet: usb: lan78xx: Soluciona el error de tiempo de espera de lectura de EEPROM perdido (-ETIMEDOUT) en lan78xx_read_raw_eeprom\n\nSyzbot inform\u00f3 un BUG de lectura de variable no inicializada con la siguiente pila de llamadas.\n\nlan78xx 8-1:1.0 (net_device sin nombre) (no inicializado): Tiempo de espera de la operaci\u00f3n de lectura de EEPROM\n=====================================================\nBUG: KMSAN: valor no inicializado en lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1095 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: valor no inicializado en lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: valor no inicializado en lan78xx_reset+0x999/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1095 [inline]\n lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\n lan78xx_reset+0x999/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_bind+0x711/0x1690 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3766\n lan78xx_probe+0x225c/0x3310 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:4707\n\nVariable local sig.i.i creada en:\n lan78xx_read_eeprom drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1092 [inline]\n lan78xx_init_mac_address drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:1937 [inline]\n lan78xx_reset+0x77e/0x2cd0 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3241\n lan78xx_bind+0x711/0x1690 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c:3766\n\nLa funci\u00f3n lan78xx_read_raw_eeprom no pudo propagar correctamente los errores de tiempo de espera de lectura de EEPROM (-ETIMEDOUT). En la ruta de ejecuci\u00f3n por defecto, primero intent\u00f3 restaurar la configuraci\u00f3n de pines para las salidas LED y luego devolvi\u00f3 solo el estado de esa operaci\u00f3n de restauraci\u00f3n, descartando el error de tiempo de espera original.\n\nComo resultado, los llamadores podr\u00edan tratar err\u00f3neamente el b\u00fafer de datos como v\u00e1lido, a pesar de que la lectura de la EEPROM hab\u00eda alcanzado el tiempo de espera sin datos o con datos parciales.\n\nPara solucionar esto, maneje los errores al restaurar la configuraci\u00f3n de pines LED por separado. Si la restauraci\u00f3n tiene \u00e9xito, devuelva cualquier error de tiempo de espera de EEPROM anterior correctamente al llamador."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-40189",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-11-12T22:15:45.833",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49bdb63ff64469a6de8ea901aef123c75be9bbe7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a72a7c4f675080a324d4c2167bd2314d968279f1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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