FKIE_CVE-2025-40122
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-12 11:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/intel/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "c6cca4213b618c92e4972919ee568f0fb87313b1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec980e4facef8110f6fce27e5b6344660117f01f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "43796f30507802d93ead2dc44fc9637f34671a89",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec980e4facef8110f6fce27e5b6344660117f01f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/intel/core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/x86/intel: Fix IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B MSRs access error\n\nWhen running perf_fuzzer on PTL, sometimes the below \"unchecked MSR\n access error\" is seen when accessing IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B MSRs.\n\n[ 55.611268] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x1986 (tried to write 0x0000000200000001) at rIP: 0xffffffffac564b28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)\n[ 55.611280] Call Trace:\n[ 55.611282] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 55.611284] ? intel_pmu_config_acr+0x87/0x160\n[ 55.611289] intel_pmu_enable_acr+0x6d/0x80\n[ 55.611291] intel_pmu_enable_event+0xce/0x460\n[ 55.611293] x86_pmu_start+0x78/0xb0\n[ 55.611297] x86_pmu_enable+0x218/0x3a0\n[ 55.611300] ? x86_pmu_enable+0x121/0x3a0\n[ 55.611302] perf_pmu_enable+0x40/0x50\n[ 55.611307] ctx_resched+0x19d/0x220\n[ 55.611309] __perf_install_in_context+0x284/0x2f0\n[ 55.611311] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611314] remote_function+0x52/0x70\n[ 55.611317] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611319] generic_exec_single+0x84/0x150\n[ 55.611323] smp_call_function_single+0xc5/0x1a0\n[ 55.611326] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611329] perf_install_in_context+0xd1/0x1e0\n[ 55.611331] ? __pfx___perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611333] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xa76/0x1040\n[ 55.611336] __x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x26/0x30\n[ 55.611337] x64_sys_call+0x1d8e/0x20c0\n[ 55.611339] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120\n[ 55.611343] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nOn PTL, GP counter 0 and 1 doesn\u0027t support auto counter reload feature,\nthus it would trigger a #GP when trying to write 1 on bit 0 of CFG_B MSR\nwhich requires to enable auto counter reload on GP counter 0.\n\nThe root cause of causing this issue is the check for auto counter\nreload (ACR) counter mask from user space is incorrect in\nintel_pmu_acr_late_setup() helper. It leads to an invalid ACR counter\nmask from user space could be set into hw.config1 and then written into\nCFG_B MSRs and trigger the MSR access warning.\n\ne.g., User may create a perf event with ACR counter mask (config2=0xcb),\nand there is only 1 event created, so \"cpuc-\u003en_events\" is 1.\n\nThe correct check condition should be \"i + idx \u003e= cpuc-\u003en_events\"\ninstead of \"i + idx \u003e cpuc-\u003en_events\" (it looks a typo). Otherwise,\nthe counter mask would traverse twice and an invalid \"cpuc-\u003eassign[1]\"\nbit (bit 0) is set into hw.config1 and cause MSR accessing error.\n\nBesides, also check if the ACR counter mask corresponding events are\nACR events. If not, filter out these counter mask. If a event is not a\nACR event, it could be scheduled to an HW counter which doesn\u0027t support\nACR. It\u0027s invalid to add their counter index in ACR counter mask.\n\nFurthermore, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() since it\u0027s easily triggered as\nuser could set any invalid ACR counter mask and the warning message\ncould mislead users."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nperf/x86/intel: Correcci\u00f3n del error de acceso a los MSR IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B\n\nAl ejecutar perf_fuzzer en PTL, a veces se observa el siguiente \u201cerror de acceso MSR no verificado\u201d al acceder a los MSR IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B.\n\n[ 55.611268] error de acceso MSR no verificado: WRMSR a 0x1986 (intent\u00f3 escribir 0x0000000200000001) en rIP: 0xffffffffac564b28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30)\n[ 55.611280] Traza de Llamada:\n[ 55.611282] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 55.611284] ? intel_pmu_config_acr+0x87/0x160\n[ 55.611289] intel_pmu_enable_acr+0x6d/0x80\n[ 55.611291] intel_pmu_enable_event+0xce/0x460\n[ 55.611293] x86_pmu_start+0x78/0xb0\n[ 55.611297] x86_pmu_enable+0x218/0x3a0\n[ 55.611300] ? x86_pmu_enable+0x121/0x3a0\n[ 55.611302] perf_pmu_enable+0x40/0x50\n[ 55.611307] ctx_resched+0x19d/0x220\n[ 55.611309] __perf_install_in_context+0x284/0x2f0\n[ 55.611311] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611314] remote_function+0x52/0x70\n[ 55.611317] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611319] generic_exec_single+0x84/0x150\n[ 55.611323] smp_call_function_single+0xc5/0x1a0\n[ 55.611326] ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611329] perf_install_in_context+0xd1/0x1e0\n[ 55.611331] ? __pfx___perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10\n[ 55.611333] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xa76/0x1040\n[ 55.611336] __x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x26/0x30\n[ 55.611337] x64_sys_call+0x1d8e/0x20c0\n[ 55.611339] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120\n[ 55.611343] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nEn PTL, los contadores GP 0 y 1 no soportan la caracter\u00edstica de recarga autom\u00e1tica de contador, por lo tanto, activar\u00eda un #GP al intentar escribir 1 en el bit 0 del MSR CFG_B, lo que requiere habilitar la recarga autom\u00e1tica de contador en el contador GP 0.\n\nLa causa ra\u00edz de este problema es que la verificaci\u00f3n de la m\u00e1scara de contador de recarga autom\u00e1tica (ACR) desde el espacio de usuario es incorrecta en la funci\u00f3n auxiliar intel_pmu_acr_late_setup(). Esto lleva a que una m\u00e1scara de contador ACR inv\u00e1lida desde el espacio de usuario podr\u00eda establecerse en hw.config1 y luego escribirse en los MSR CFG_B y activar la advertencia de acceso MSR.\n\nPor ejemplo, el usuario puede crear un evento perf con una m\u00e1scara de contador ACR (config2=0xcb), y solo se crea 1 evento, por lo que \u201ccpuc-\u003en_events\u201d es 1.\n\nLa condici\u00f3n de verificaci\u00f3n correcta deber\u00eda ser \u201ci + idx \u003e= cpuc-\u003en_events\u201d en lugar de \u201ci + idx \u003e cpuc-\u003en_events\u201d (parece un error tipogr\u00e1fico). De lo contrario, la m\u00e1scara de contador se recorrer\u00eda dos veces y un bit \u201ccpuc-\u003eassign[1]\u201d inv\u00e1lido (bit 0) se establecer\u00eda en hw.config1 y causar\u00eda un error de acceso MSR.\n\nAdem\u00e1s, tambi\u00e9n se debe verificar si los eventos correspondientes a la m\u00e1scara de contador ACR son eventos ACR. Si no, filtrar esta m\u00e1scara de contador. Si un evento no es un evento ACR, podr\u00eda programarse en un contador de hardware que no soporta ACR. Es inv\u00e1lido a\u00f1adir su \u00edndice de contador en la m\u00e1scara de contador ACR.\n\nAdem\u00e1s, eliminar el WARN_ON_ONCE() ya que se activa f\u00e1cilmente, puesto que el usuario podr\u00eda establecer cualquier m\u00e1scara de contador ACR inv\u00e1lida y el mensaje de advertencia podr\u00eda inducir a error a los usuarios."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-40122",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-11-12T11:15:41.677",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43796f30507802d93ead2dc44fc9637f34671a89"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6cca4213b618c92e4972919ee568f0fb87313b1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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