FKIE_CVE-2025-40073
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-28 12:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_plane.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f1dbb3eedb7db4cad45d2619edb1cce6041f79e3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3ed12a3664b362e3462cca61d41f9a9460c9e260",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6fc616723bb5fd4289d7422fa013da062b44ae55",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3ed12a3664b362e3462cca61d41f9a9460c9e260",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_plane.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/msm: Do not validate SSPP when it is not ready\n\nCurrent code will validate current plane and previous plane to\nconfirm they can share a SSPP with multi-rect mode. The SSPP\nis already allocated for previous plane, while current plane\nis not associated with any SSPP yet. Null pointer is referenced\nwhen validating the SSPP of current plane. Skip SSPP validation\nfor current plane.\n\nUnable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020\nMem abort info:\n ESR = 0x0000000096000004\n EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits\n SET = 0, FnV = 0\n EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault\nData abort info:\n ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000\n CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0\n GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0\nuser pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000888ac3000\n[0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000\nInternal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1891 Comm: modetest Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc2-g3ee3f6e1202e #335 PREEMPT\nTainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC\nHardware name: SM8650 EV1 rev1 4slam 2et (DT)\npstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : dpu_plane_is_multirect_capable+0x68/0x90\nlr : dpu_assign_plane_resources+0x288/0x410\nsp : ffff800093dcb770\nx29: ffff800093dcb770 x28: 0000000000002000 x27: ffff000817c6c000\nx26: ffff000806b46368 x25: ffff0008013f6080 x24: ffff00080cbf4800\nx23: ffff000810842680 x22: ffff0008013f1080 x21: ffff00080cc86080\nx20: ffff000806b463b0 x19: ffff00080cbf5a00 x18: 00000000ffffffff\nx17: 707a5f657a696c61 x16: 0000000000000003 x15: 0000000000002200\nx14: 00000000ffffffff x13: 00aaaaaa00aaaaaa x12: 0000000000000000\nx11: ffff000817c6e2b8 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff80008106a950\nx8 : ffff00080cbf48f4 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000\nx5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000438 x3 : 0000000000000438\nx2 : ffff800082e245e0 x1 : 0000000000000008 x0 : 0000000000000000\nCall trace:\n dpu_plane_is_multirect_capable+0x68/0x90 (P)\n dpu_crtc_atomic_check+0x5bc/0x650\n drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0x13c/0x220\n drm_atomic_helper_check+0x58/0xb8\n msm_atomic_check+0xd8/0xf0\n drm_atomic_check_only+0x4a8/0x968\n drm_atomic_commit+0x50/0xd8\n drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0x140/0x188\n __setplane_atomic+0xfc/0x148\n drm_mode_setplane+0x164/0x378\n drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc0/0x140\n drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x500\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xbc/0xf8\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf8\n do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40\n el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168\n el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0\nCode: b9402021 370fffc1 f9401441 3707ff81 (f94010a1)\n---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nPatchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/669224/"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ndrm/msm: No validar SSPP cuando no est\u00e1 listo\n\nEl c\u00f3digo actual validar\u00e1 el plano actual y el plano anterior para confirmar que pueden compartir un SSPP con el modo multi-rect. El SSPP ya est\u00e1 asignado para el plano anterior, mientras que el plano actual a\u00fan no est\u00e1 asociado con ning\u00fan SSPP. Se hace referencia a un puntero nulo al validar el SSPP del plano actual. Omitir la validaci\u00f3n de SSPP para el plano actual.\n\nNo se puede manejar la desreferencia de puntero NULL del kernel en la direcci\u00f3n virtual 0000000000000020\nInformaci\u00f3n de aborto de memoria:\n ESR = 0x0000000096000004\n EC = 0x25: DABT (EL actual), IL = 32 bits\n SET = 0, FnV = 0\n EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n FSC = 0x04: fallo de traducci\u00f3n de nivel 0\nInformaci\u00f3n de aborto de datos:\n ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000\n CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0\n GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0\ntabla de p\u00e1ginas de usuario: p\u00e1ginas de 4k, VA de 48 bits, pgdp=0000000888ac3000\n[0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000\nError interno: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP\nM\u00f3dulos enlazados:\nCPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1891 Comm: modetest Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc2-g3ee3f6e1202e #335 PREEMPT\nTainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC\nNombre del hardware: SM8650 EV1 rev1 4slam 2et (DT)\npstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\npc : dpu_plane_is_multirect_capable+0x68/0x90\nlr : dpu_assign_plane_resources+0x288/0x410\nsp : ffff800093dcb770\nx29: ffff800093dcb770 x28: 0000000000002000 x27: ffff000817c6c000\nx26: ffff000806b46368 x25: ffff0008013f6080 x24: ffff00080cbf4800\nx23: ffff000810842680 x22: ffff0008013f1080 x21: ffff00080cc86080\nx20: ffff000806b463b0 x19: ffff00080cbf5a00 x18: 00000000ffffffff\nx17: 707a5f657a696c61 x16: 0000000000000003 x15: 0000000000002200\nx14: 00000000ffffffff x13: 00aaaaaa00aaaaaa x12: 0000000000000000\nx11: ffff000817c6e2b8 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff80008106a950\nx8 : ffff00080cbf48f4 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000\nx5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000438 x3 : 0000000000000438\nx2 : ffff800082e245e0 x1 : 0000000000000008 x0 : 0000000000000000\nRastro de llamada:\n dpu_plane_is_multirect_capable+0x68/0x90 (P)\n dpu_crtc_atomic_check+0x5bc/0x650\n drm_atomic_helper_check_planes+0x13c/0x220\n drm_atomic_helper_check+0x58/0xb8\n msm_atomic_check+0xd8/0xf0\n drm_atomic_check_only+0x4a8/0x968\n drm_atomic_commit+0x50/0xd8\n drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0x140/0x188\n __setplane_atomic+0xfc/0x148\n drm_mode_setplane+0x164/0x378\n drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc0/0x140\n drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x500\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xbc/0xf8\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf8\n do_el0_svc+0x28/0x40\n el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x144/0x168\n el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0\nC\u00f3digo: b9402021 370fffc1 f9401441 3707ff81 (f94010a1)\n---[ fin del rastro 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nPatchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/669224/"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-40073",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-10-28T12:15:41.830",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fc616723bb5fd4289d7422fa013da062b44ae55"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1dbb3eedb7db4cad45d2619edb1cce6041f79e3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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