FKIE_CVE-2025-39944
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-04 08:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix use-after-free bugs in otx2_sync_tstamp()
The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in otx2_ptp_destroy(),
which does not ensure that the delayed work item synctstamp_work has fully
completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios
where otx2_ptp is deallocated by otx2_ptp_destroy(), while synctstamp_work
remains active and attempts to dereference otx2_ptp in otx2_sync_tstamp().
Furthermore, the synctstamp_work is cyclic, the likelihood of triggering
the bug is nonnegligible.
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
otx2_remove() |
otx2_ptp_destroy() | otx2_sync_tstamp()
cancel_delayed_work() |
kfree(ptp) |
| ptp = container_of(...); //UAF
| ptp-> //UAF
This is confirmed by a KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800aa09a18 by task bash/136
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
otx2_ptp_init+0xb1/0x860
otx2_probe+0x4eb/0xc30
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__driver_attach+0xd2/0x310
bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170
bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500
driver_register+0x132/0x460
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720
kernel_init+0x1a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 136:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
otx2_ptp_destroy+0x38/0x80
otx2_remove+0x10d/0x4c0
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30
remove_store+0xcc/0xe0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440
vfs_write+0x871/0xd70
ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure
that the delayed work item is properly canceled before the otx2_ptp is
deallocated.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce
and test it, I simulated the OcteonTX2 PCI device in QEMU and introduced
artificial delays within the otx2_sync_tstamp() function to increase the
likelihood of triggering the bug.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.17 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_ptp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2786879aebf363806a13d41e8d5f99202ddd23d9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2958d17a898416c6193431676f6130b68a2cb9fc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d2cfefa14ce8137b17f99683f968bebf134b6a48",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2958d17a898416c6193431676f6130b68a2cb9fc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ff27e23b311fed4d25e3852e27ba693416d4c7b3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2958d17a898416c6193431676f6130b68a2cb9fc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5ca20bb7b4bde72110c3ae78423cbfdd0157aa36",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2958d17a898416c6193431676f6130b68a2cb9fc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f8b4687151021db61841af983f1cb7be6915d4ef",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2958d17a898416c6193431676f6130b68a2cb9fc",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_ptp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.154",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.108",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.49",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.16.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.16.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A57D06D5-F248-4BF0-8580-9873AB71028A",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.154",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A7E8EAEE-7731-4996-9578-696255D61EA2",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.108",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CAA033E9-A2C5-4976-A83E-9804D8FB827F",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.49",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "638DD910-1189-4F5E-98BF-2D436B695112",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.16.9",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "327D22EF-390B-454C-BD31-2ED23C998A1C",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C730CD9A-D969-4A8E-9522-162AAF7C0EE9",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "39982C4B-716E-4B2F-8196-FA301F47807D",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "340BEEA9-D70D-4290-B502-FBB1032353B1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "47E4C5C0-079F-4838-971B-8C503D48FCC2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "5A4516A6-C12E-42A4-8C0E-68AEF3264504",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocteontx2-pf: Fix use-after-free bugs in otx2_sync_tstamp()\n\nThe original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in otx2_ptp_destroy(),\nwhich does not ensure that the delayed work item synctstamp_work has fully\ncompleted if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios\nwhere otx2_ptp is deallocated by otx2_ptp_destroy(), while synctstamp_work\nremains active and attempts to dereference otx2_ptp in otx2_sync_tstamp().\nFurthermore, the synctstamp_work is cyclic, the likelihood of triggering\nthe bug is nonnegligible.\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)\notx2_remove() |\n otx2_ptp_destroy() | otx2_sync_tstamp()\n cancel_delayed_work() |\n kfree(ptp) |\n | ptp = container_of(...); //UAF\n | ptp-\u003e //UAF\n\nThis is confirmed by a KASAN report:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\nWrite of size 8 at addr ffff88800aa09a18 by task bash/136\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70\n print_report+0xcf/0x610\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n ? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10\n ? ktime_get+0x60/0x140\n ? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20\n ? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0\n run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190\n handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550\n irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n...\nAllocated by task 1:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90\n otx2_ptp_init+0xb1/0x860\n otx2_probe+0x4eb/0xc30\n local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190\n pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470\n really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0\n __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120\n __driver_attach+0xd2/0x310\n bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170\n bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500\n driver_register+0x132/0x460\n do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300\n kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720\n kernel_init+0x1a/0x150\n ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nFreed by task 136:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50\n kfree+0x137/0x370\n otx2_ptp_destroy+0x38/0x80\n otx2_remove+0x10d/0x4c0\n pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0\n device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210\n pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150\n pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30\n remove_store+0xcc/0xe0\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440\n vfs_write+0x871/0xd70\n ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0\n do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n...\n\nReplace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure\nthat the delayed work item is properly canceled before the otx2_ptp is\ndeallocated.\n\nThis bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce\nand test it, I simulated the OcteonTX2 PCI device in QEMU and introduced\nartificial delays within the otx2_sync_tstamp() function to increase the\nlikelihood of triggering the bug."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nocteontx2-pf: Corrige errores de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n en otx2_sync_tstamp()\n\nEl c\u00f3digo original se basa en cancel_delayed_work() en otx2_ptp_destroy(), lo que no asegura que el elemento de trabajo retrasado synctstamp_work se haya completado completamente si ya estaba en ejecuci\u00f3n. Esto lleva a escenarios de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n donde otx2_ptp es desasignado por otx2_ptp_destroy(), mientras synctstamp_work permanece activo e intenta desreferenciar otx2_ptp en otx2_sync_tstamp(). Adem\u00e1s, el synctstamp_work es c\u00edclico, la probabilidad de activar el error es no despreciable.\n\nUna condici\u00f3n de carrera t\u00edpica se ilustra a continuaci\u00f3n:\n\nCPU 0 (limpieza) | CPU 1 (callback de trabajo retrasado)\notx2_remove() |\n otx2_ptp_destroy() | otx2_sync_tstamp()\n cancel_delayed_work() |\n kfree(ptp) |\n | ptp = container_of(...); //UAF\n | ptp-\u003e //UAF\n\nEsto es confirmado por un informe KASAN:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\nEscritura de tama\u00f1o 8 en la direcci\u00f3n ffff88800aa09a18 por la tarea bash/136\n...\nRastro de Llamada:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70\n print_report+0xcf/0x610\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0\n ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0\n ? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10\n ? ktime_get+0x60/0x140\n ? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20\n ? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0\n run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190\n handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550\n irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n...\nAsignado por la tarea 1:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90\n otx2_ptp_init+0xb1/0x860\n otx2_probe+0x4eb/0xc30\n local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190\n pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470\n really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0\n __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120\n __driver_attach+0xd2/0x310\n bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170\n bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500\n driver_register+0x132/0x460\n do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300\n kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720\n kernel_init+0x1a/0x150\n ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\nLiberado por la tarea 136:\n kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50\n kfree+0x137/0x370\n otx2_ptp_destroy+0x38/0x80\n otx2_remove+0x10d/0x4c0\n pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0\n device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210\n pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150\n pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30\n remove_store+0xcc/0xe0\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440\n vfs_write+0x871/0xd70\n ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0\n do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n...\n\nReemplace cancel_delayed_work() con cancel_delayed_work_sync() para asegurar que el elemento de trabajo retrasado sea cancelado correctamente antes de que otx2_ptp sea desasignado.\n\nEste error fue inicialmente identificado a trav\u00e9s de an\u00e1lisis est\u00e1tico. Para reproducirlo y probarlo, simul\u00e9 el dispositivo PCI OcteonTX2 en QEMU e introduje retrasos artificiales dentro de la funci\u00f3n otx2_sync_tstamp() para aumentar la probabilidad de activar el error."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-39944",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-39944",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:54:57.678441Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-10-04T08:15:47.480",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2786879aebf363806a13d41e8d5f99202ddd23d9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ca20bb7b4bde72110c3ae78423cbfdd0157aa36"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2cfefa14ce8137b17f99683f968bebf134b6a48"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8b4687151021db61841af983f1cb7be6915d4ef"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff27e23b311fed4d25e3852e27ba693416d4c7b3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.