FKIE_CVE-2025-39936

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-04 08:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10
Severity
5.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Always pass in an error pointer to __sev_platform_shutdown_locked() When 9770b428b1a2 ("crypto: ccp - Move dev_info/err messages for SEV/SNP init and shutdown") moved the error messages dumping so that they don't need to be issued by the callers, it missed the case where __sev_firmware_shutdown() calls __sev_platform_shutdown_locked() with a NULL argument which leads to a NULL ptr deref on the shutdown path, during suspend to disk: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 983 Comm: hib.sh Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-i, BIOS 2.5 09/08/2022 RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold+0x0/0x21 [ccp] That rIP is: 00000000000006fd <__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold>: 6fd: 8b 13 mov (%rbx),%edx 6ff: 48 8b 7d 00 mov 0x0(%rbp),%rdi 703: 89 c1 mov %eax,%ecx Code: 74 05 31 ff 41 89 3f 49 8b 3e 89 ea 48 c7 c6 a0 8e 54 a0 41 bf 92 ff ff ff e8 e5 2e 09 e1 c6 05 2a d4 38 00 01 e9 26 af ff ff <8b> 13 48 8b 7d 00 89 c1 48 c7 c6 18 90 54 a0 89 44 24 04 e8 c1 2e RSP: 0018:ffffc90005467d00 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000ffffff92 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ and %rbx is nice and clean. Call Trace: <TASK> __sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0 sev_dev_destroy psp_dev_destroy sp_destroy pci_device_shutdown device_shutdown kernel_power_off hibernate.cold state_store kernfs_fop_write_iter vfs_write ksys_write do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe Pass in a pointer to the function-local error var in the caller. With that addressed, suspending the ccp shows the error properly at least: ccp 0000:47:00.1: sev command 0x2 timed out, disabling PSP ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV: failed to SHUTDOWN error 0x0, rc -110 SEV-SNP: Leaking PFN range 0x146800-0x146a00 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x146800 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x146800 - 0x146a00] ... ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed, rc -16, error 0x0 ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5 kvm: exiting hardware virtualization reboot: Power down Btw, this driver is crying to be cleaned up to pass in a proper I/O struct which can be used to store information between the different functions, otherwise stuff like that will happen in the future again.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46834d90a9a13549264b9581067d8f746b4b36ccPatch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc509293c9d4f4f74e776f4a0bbb61f63c041938Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa30d62ab62d8a123f20febaca4390525e2d2ad5
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fa30d62ab62d8a123f20febaca4390525e2d2ad5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e6bef2d0dfa036afc32df982240d0368b17ee7fd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bc509293c9d4f4f74e776f4a0bbb61f63c041938",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9770b428b1a28360663f1f5e524ee458b4cf454b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "46834d90a9a13549264b9581067d8f746b4b36cc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9770b428b1a28360663f1f5e524ee458b4cf454b",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.16"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.16",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.16.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16.9",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.17",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A29694A5-4AF1-4C6F-8828-187FA35BAC01",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.16.9",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "327D22EF-390B-454C-BD31-2ED23C998A1C",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C730CD9A-D969-4A8E-9522-162AAF7C0EE9",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "39982C4B-716E-4B2F-8196-FA301F47807D",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "340BEEA9-D70D-4290-B502-FBB1032353B1",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "47E4C5C0-079F-4838-971B-8C503D48FCC2",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "5A4516A6-C12E-42A4-8C0E-68AEF3264504",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: ccp - Always pass in an error pointer to __sev_platform_shutdown_locked()\n\nWhen\n\n  9770b428b1a2 (\"crypto: ccp - Move dev_info/err messages for SEV/SNP init and shutdown\")\n\nmoved the error messages dumping so that they don\u0027t need to be issued by\nthe callers, it missed the case where __sev_firmware_shutdown() calls\n__sev_platform_shutdown_locked() with a NULL argument which leads to\na NULL ptr deref on the shutdown path, during suspend to disk:\n\n  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n  PGD 0 P4D 0\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 983 Comm: hib.sh Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n  Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-i, BIOS 2.5 09/08/2022\n  RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold+0x0/0x21 [ccp]\n\nThat rIP is:\n\n  00000000000006fd \u003c__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold\u003e:\n   6fd:   8b 13                   mov    (%rbx),%edx\n   6ff:   48 8b 7d 00             mov    0x0(%rbp),%rdi\n   703:   89 c1                   mov    %eax,%ecx\n\n  Code: 74 05 31 ff 41 89 3f 49 8b 3e 89 ea 48 c7 c6 a0 8e 54 a0 41 bf 92 ff ff ff e8 e5 2e 09 e1 c6 05 2a d4 38 00 01 e9 26 af ff ff \u003c8b\u003e 13 48 8b 7d 00 89 c1 48 c7 c6 18 90 54 a0 89 44 24 04 e8 c1 2e\n  RSP: 0018:ffffc90005467d00 EFLAGS: 00010282\n  RAX: 00000000ffffff92 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n  \t\t\t     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nand %rbx is nice and clean.\n\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   __sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0\n   sev_dev_destroy\n   psp_dev_destroy\n   sp_destroy\n   pci_device_shutdown\n   device_shutdown\n   kernel_power_off\n   hibernate.cold\n   state_store\n   kernfs_fop_write_iter\n   vfs_write\n   ksys_write\n   do_syscall_64\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe\n\nPass in a pointer to the function-local error var in the caller.\n\nWith that addressed, suspending the ccp shows the error properly at\nleast:\n\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: sev command 0x2 timed out, disabling PSP\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV: failed to SHUTDOWN error 0x0, rc -110\n  SEV-SNP: Leaking PFN range 0x146800-0x146a00\n  SEV-SNP: PFN 0x146800 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x146800 - 0x146a00]\n  ...\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed, rc -16, error 0x0\n  ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5\n  kvm: exiting hardware virtualization\n  reboot: Power down\n\nBtw, this driver is crying to be cleaned up to pass in a proper I/O\nstruct which can be used to store information between the different\nfunctions, otherwise stuff like that will happen in the future again."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ncrypto: ccp - Siempre pase un puntero de error a __sev_platform_shutdown_locked()\n\nCuando\n\n  9770b428b1a2 (\u0027crypto: ccp - Mover mensajes dev_info/err para la inicializaci\u00f3n y apagado de SEV/SNP\u0027)\n\nmovi\u00f3 el volcado de mensajes de error para que no necesiten ser emitidos por los llamadores, se pas\u00f3 por alto el caso donde __sev_firmware_shutdown() llama a __sev_platform_shutdown_locked() con un argumento NULL, lo que lleva a una desreferencia de puntero NULL en la ruta de apagado, durante la suspensi\u00f3n a disco:\n\n  #PF: acceso de lectura de supervisor en modo kernel\n  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - p\u00e1gina no presente\n  PGD 0 P4D 0\n  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 983 Comm: hib.sh No contaminado 6.17.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntario)\n  Nombre de hardware: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-i, BIOS 2.5 09/08/2022\n  RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold+0x0/0x21 [ccp]\n\nEse rIP es:\n\n  00000000000006fd \u003c__sev_platform_shutdown_locked.cold\u003e:\n   6fd:   8b 13                   mov    (%rbx),%edx\n   6ff:   48 8b 7d 00             mov    0x0(%rbp),%rdi\n   703:   89 c1                   mov    %eax,%ecx\n\n  Code: 74 05 31 ff 41 89 3f 49 8b 3e 89 ea 48 c7 c6 a0 8e 54 a0 41 bf 92 ff ff ff e8 e5 2e 09 e1 c6 05 2a d4 38 00 01 e9 26 af ff ff \u003c8b\u003e 13 48 8b 7d 00 89 c1 48 c7 c6 18 90 54 a0 89 44 24 04 e8 c1 2e\n  RSP: 0018:ffffc90005467d00 EFLAGS: 00010282\n  RAX: 00000000ffffff92 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n  \t\t\t     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\ny %rbx est\u00e1 limpio y ordenado.\n\n  Traza de Llamada:\n   \u003cTAREA\u003e\n   __sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0\n   sev_dev_destroy\n   psp_dev_destroy\n   sp_destroy\n   pci_device_shutdown\n   device_shutdown\n   kernel_power_off\n   hibernate.cold\n   state_store\n   kernfs_fop_write_iter\n   vfs_write\n   ksys_write\n   do_syscall_64\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe\n\nPase un puntero a la variable de error local de la funci\u00f3n en el llamador.\n\nCon eso resuelto, suspender el ccp muestra el error correctamente al menos:\n\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: el comando sev 0x2 agot\u00f3 el tiempo de espera, deshabilitando PSP\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: SEV: fall\u00f3 al APAGAR error 0x0, rc -110\n  SEV-SNP: Fuga de rango PFN 0x146800-0x146a00\n  SEV-SNP: PFN 0x146800 sin asignar, volcando entradas no cero en la regi\u00f3n PFN de 2M: [0x146800 - 0x146a00]\n  ...\n  ccp 0000:47:00.1: el apagado del firmware SEV-SNP fall\u00f3, rc -16, error 0x0\n  ACPI: PM: Prepar\u00e1ndose para entrar en el estado de suspensi\u00f3n del sistema S5\n  kvm: saliendo de la virtualizaci\u00f3n de hardware\n  reinicio: Apagado\n\nPor cierto, este controlador est\u00e1 pidiendo a gritos ser limpiado para pasar una estructura de E/S adecuada que pueda ser utilizada para almacenar informaci\u00f3n entre las diferentes funciones, de lo contrario, cosas como esa volver\u00e1n a ocurrir en el futuro."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-39936",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 5.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-10-04T08:15:46.460",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46834d90a9a13549264b9581067d8f746b4b36cc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc509293c9d4f4f74e776f4a0bbb61f63c041938"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa30d62ab62d8a123f20febaca4390525e2d2ad5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-476"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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