FKIE_CVE-2025-39723

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-05 18:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:10
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix unbuffered write error handling If all the subrequests in an unbuffered write stream fail, the subrequest collector doesn't update the stream->transferred value and it retains its initial LONG_MAX value. Unfortunately, if all active streams fail, then we take the smallest value of { LONG_MAX, LONG_MAX, ... } as the value to set in wreq->transferred - which is then returned from ->write_iter(). LONG_MAX was chosen as the initial value so that all the streams can be quickly assessed by taking the smallest value of all stream->transferred - but this only works if we've set any of them. Fix this by adding a flag to indicate whether the value in stream->transferred is valid and checking that when we integrate the values. stream->transferred can then be initialised to zero. This was found by running the generic/750 xfstest against cifs with cache=none. It splices data to the target file. Once (if) it has used up all the available scratch space, the writes start failing with ENOSPC. This causes ->write_iter() to fail. However, it was returning wreq->transferred, i.e. LONG_MAX, rather than an error (because it thought the amount transferred was non-zero) and iter_file_splice_write() would then try to clean up that amount of pipe bufferage - leading to an oops when it overran. The kernel log showed: CIFS: VFS: Send error in write = -28 followed by: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 with: RIP: 0010:iter_file_splice_write+0x3a4/0x520 do_splice+0x197/0x4e0 or: RIP: 0010:pipe_buf_release (include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h:282) iter_file_splice_write (fs/splice.c:755) Also put a warning check into splice to announce if ->write_iter() returned that it had written more than it was asked to.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 6.17
linux linux_kernel 6.17

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/netfs/read_collect.c",
            "fs/netfs/write_collect.c",
            "fs/netfs/write_issue.c",
            "fs/splice.c",
            "include/linux/netfs.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "f08c80af3c9a9849cd178b4843b7c01d103506a1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288ace2f57c9d06dd2e42bd80d03747d879a4068",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "387164a2b97e1f5404c6d0049a7409bac7d2bc5b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288ace2f57c9d06dd2e42bd80d03747d879a4068",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a3de58b12ce074ec05b8741fa28d62ccb1070468",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "288ace2f57c9d06dd2e42bd80d03747d879a4068",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/netfs/read_collect.c",
            "fs/netfs/write_collect.c",
            "fs/netfs/write_issue.c",
            "fs/splice.c",
            "include/linux/netfs.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.10"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.10",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.44",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.16.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.16.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.17",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "489EF11B-3951-48B6-8DCA-E6B0DDAF7910",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.44",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.10",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "AFC28995-B8C3-4B68-8CB6-78E792B6629D",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.16.4",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "327D22EF-390B-454C-BD31-2ED23C998A1C",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C730CD9A-D969-4A8E-9522-162AAF7C0EE9",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfs: Fix unbuffered write error handling\n\nIf all the subrequests in an unbuffered write stream fail, the subrequest\ncollector doesn\u0027t update the stream-\u003etransferred value and it retains its\ninitial LONG_MAX value.  Unfortunately, if all active streams fail, then we\ntake the smallest value of { LONG_MAX, LONG_MAX, ... } as the value to set\nin wreq-\u003etransferred - which is then returned from -\u003ewrite_iter().\n\nLONG_MAX was chosen as the initial value so that all the streams can be\nquickly assessed by taking the smallest value of all stream-\u003etransferred -\nbut this only works if we\u0027ve set any of them.\n\nFix this by adding a flag to indicate whether the value in\nstream-\u003etransferred is valid and checking that when we integrate the\nvalues.  stream-\u003etransferred can then be initialised to zero.\n\nThis was found by running the generic/750 xfstest against cifs with\ncache=none.  It splices data to the target file.  Once (if) it has used up\nall the available scratch space, the writes start failing with ENOSPC.\nThis causes -\u003ewrite_iter() to fail.  However, it was returning\nwreq-\u003etransferred, i.e. LONG_MAX, rather than an error (because it thought\nthe amount transferred was non-zero) and iter_file_splice_write() would\nthen try to clean up that amount of pipe bufferage - leading to an oops\nwhen it overran.  The kernel log showed:\n\n    CIFS: VFS: Send error in write = -28\n\nfollowed by:\n\n    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008\n\nwith:\n\n    RIP: 0010:iter_file_splice_write+0x3a4/0x520\n    do_splice+0x197/0x4e0\n\nor:\n\n    RIP: 0010:pipe_buf_release (include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h:282)\n    iter_file_splice_write (fs/splice.c:755)\n\nAlso put a warning check into splice to announce if -\u003ewrite_iter() returned\nthat it had written more than it was asked to."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad:\n\nnetfs: Correcci\u00f3n del manejo de errores de escritura sin b\u00fafer\n\nSi todas las subpeticiones en un flujo de escritura sin b\u00fafer fallan, el recolector de subpeticiones no actualiza el valor de stream-\u003etransferred y este retiene su valor inicial LONG_MAX. Desafortunadamente, si todos los flujos activos fallan, entonces tomamos el valor m\u00e1s peque\u00f1o de { LONG_MAX, LONG_MAX, ... } como el valor a establecer en wreq-\u003etransferred, el cual es luego devuelto desde -\u003ewrite_iter().\n\nLONG_MAX fue elegido como el valor inicial para que todos los flujos puedan ser evaluados r\u00e1pidamente tomando el valor m\u00e1s peque\u00f1o de todos los stream-\u003etransferred, pero esto solo funciona si hemos establecido alguno de ellos.\n\nSolucione esto a\u00f1adiendo una bandera para indicar si el valor en stream-\u003etransferred es v\u00e1lido y verificando eso cuando integramos los valores. stream-\u003etransferred puede entonces ser inicializado a cero.\n\nEsto fue encontrado ejecutando el xfstest generic/750 contra cifs con cache=none. Empalma datos al archivo de destino. Una vez (si) ha agotado todo el espacio de trabajo disponible, las escrituras comienzan a fallar con ENOSPC. Esto causa que -\u003ewrite_iter() falle. Sin embargo, estaba devolviendo wreq-\u003etransferred, es decir, LONG_MAX, en lugar de un error (porque pens\u00f3 que la cantidad transferida no era cero) e iter_file_splice_write() intentar\u00eda entonces limpiar esa cantidad de b\u00fafer de tuber\u00eda, lo que llev\u00f3 a un \u0027oops\u0027 cuando se desbord\u00f3. El registro del kernel mostr\u00f3:\n\n    CIFS: VFS: Send error in write = -28\n\nseguido de:\n\n    BUG: desreferencia de puntero NULL del kernel, direcci\u00f3n: 0000000000000008\n\ncon:\n\n    RIP: 0010:iter_file_splice_write+0x3a4/0x520\n    do_splice+0x197/0x4e0\n\no:\n\n    RIP: 0010:pipe_buf_release (include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h:282)\n    iter_file_splice_write (fs/splice.c:755)\n\nTambi\u00e9n se a\u00f1adi\u00f3 una verificaci\u00f3n de advertencia en splice para anunciar si -\u003ewrite_iter() devolvi\u00f3 que hab\u00eda escrito m\u00e1s de lo que se le pidi\u00f3."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-39723",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:10:00.160",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-09-05T18:15:50.043",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/387164a2b97e1f5404c6d0049a7409bac7d2bc5b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3de58b12ce074ec05b8741fa28d62ccb1070468"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f08c80af3c9a9849cd178b4843b7c01d103506a1"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.