FKIE_CVE-2025-38291
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-07-10 08:15 - Updated: 2026-10-15 22:185.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/mhi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2563069baf243cadc76dc64d9085606742c4b282",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a9b46dd2e483bf99fa09e6aeea7701960abaa902",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e9e094a9734ea3bd4d4d117c915ccf129ac61ba1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a9b46dd2e483bf99fa09e6aeea7701960abaa902",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/mhi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.15.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.16",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0541C761-BD5E-4C1A-8432-83B375D7EB92",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.15.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath12k: Prevent sending WMI commands to firmware during firmware crash\n\nCurrently, we encounter the following kernel call trace when a firmware\ncrash occurs. This happens because the host sends WMI commands to the\nfirmware while it is in recovery, causing the commands to fail and\nresulting in the kernel call trace.\n\nSet the ATH12K_FLAG_CRASH_FLUSH and ATH12K_FLAG_RECOVERY flags when the\nhost driver receives the firmware crash notification from MHI. This\nprevents sending WMI commands to the firmware during recovery.\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xc0\n register_lock_class+0x6be/0x7a0\n ? __lock_acquire+0x644/0x19a0\n __lock_acquire+0x95/0x19a0\n lock_acquire+0x265/0x310\n ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]\n ? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0\n ? ath12k_ce_send+0x56/0x210 [ath12k]\n _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70\n ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]\n ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]\n ath12k_htc_send+0x178/0x390 [ath12k]\n ath12k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x76/0xa0 [ath12k]\n ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0x62/0x190 [ath12k]\n ath12k_wmi_pdev_bss_chan_info_request+0x62/0xc0 [ath1\n ath12k_mac_op_get_survey+0x2be/0x310 [ath12k]\n ieee80211_dump_survey+0x99/0x240 [mac80211]\n nl80211_dump_survey+0xe7/0x470 [cfg80211]\n ? kmalloc_reserve+0x59/0xf0\n genl_dumpit+0x24/0x70\n netlink_dump+0x177/0x360\n __netlink_dump_start+0x206/0x280\n genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.22+0x8a/0xe0\n ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.23+0xe0/0xe0\n ? genl_op_lock.part.12+0x10/0x10\n ? genl_dumpit+0x70/0x70\n genl_rcv_msg+0x1d0/0x290\n ? nl80211_del_station+0x330/0x330 [cfg80211]\n ? genl_get_cmd_both+0x50/0x50\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100\n genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30\n netlink_unicast+0x1b6/0x260\n netlink_sendmsg+0x31a/0x450\n __sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xb0\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x260\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x89/0xe0\n ? local_clock_noinstr+0xb/0xc0\n ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40\n ? kfree+0x1de/0x370\n ? __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0\n\nTested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: ath12k: Evitar el env\u00edo de comandos WMI al firmware durante un fallo del firmware Actualmente, encontramos el siguiente seguimiento de llamadas al kernel cuando se produce un fallo del firmware. Esto sucede porque el host env\u00eda comandos WMI al firmware mientras est\u00e1 en recuperaci\u00f3n, lo que provoca que los comandos fallen y resulte en el seguimiento de llamadas al kernel. Establezca los indicadores ATH12K_FLAG_CRASH_FLUSH y ATH12K_FLAG_RECOVERY cuando el controlador del host reciba la notificaci\u00f3n de fallo del firmware de MHI. Esto evita el env\u00edo de comandos WMI al firmware durante la recuperaci\u00f3n. Seguimiento de llamadas: dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xc0 register_lock_class+0x6be/0x7a0 ? __lock_acquire+0x644/0x19a0 __lock_acquire+0x95/0x19a0 lock_acquire+0x265/0x310 ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0 ? ath12k_ce_send+0x56/0x210 [ath12k] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70 ? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k] ath12k_htc_send+0x178/0x390 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x76/0xa0 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0x62/0x190 [ath12k] ath12k_wmi_pdev_bss_chan_info_request+0x62/0xc0 [ath1 ath12k_mac_op_get_survey+0x2be/0x310 [ath12k] ieee80211_dump_survey+0x99/0x240 [mac80211] nl80211_dump_survey+0xe7/0x470 [cfg80211] ? kmalloc_reserve+0x59/0xf0 genl_dumpit+0x24/0x70 netlink_dump+0x177/0x360 __netlink_dump_start+0x206/0x280 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.22+0x8a/0xe0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.23+0xe0/0xe0 ? genl_op_lock.part.12+0x10/0x10 ? genl_dumpit+0x70/0x70 genl_rcv_msg+0x1d0/0x290 ? nl80211_del_station+0x330/0x330 [cfg80211] ? genl_get_cmd_both+0x50/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100 genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x1b6/0x260 netlink_sendmsg+0x31a/0x450 __sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xb0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x260 ___sys_sendmsg+0x89/0xe0 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xb/0xc0 ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40 ? kfree+0x1de/0x370 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0 Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 "
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-38291",
"lastModified": "2026-10-15T22:18:38.037",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-38291",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:49:22.834366Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-07-10T08:15:27.700",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2563069baf243cadc76dc64d9085606742c4b282"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e094a9734ea3bd4d4d117c915ccf129ac61ba1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-670"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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