FKIE_CVE-2025-38209
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-07-04 14:15 - Updated: 2026-10-15 22:187.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "db1da838b6012e4570c6f81e28ffe1d0ff595948",
"status": "affected",
"version": "104d0e2f622233477ef7e57e59e8a4c3bb062c82",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e7143706702a209c814ed2c3fc6486c2a7decf6c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "104d0e2f622233477ef7e57e59e8a4c3bb062c82",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.15.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.16",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "39658889-E0DA-4E0A-92D1-0621707CF733",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.15.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: remove tag set when second admin queue config fails\n\nCommit 104d0e2f6222 (\"nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure\nconcatenation\") modified nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() to call\nnvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() twice. The first call prepares for\nDH-CHAP negotitation, and the second call is required for secure\nconcatenation. However, this change triggered BUG KASAN slab-use-after-\nfree in blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter(). This BUG can be recreated by\nrepeating the blktests test case nvme/063 a few times [1].\n\nWhen the BUG happens, nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() fails in the call chain\nbelow:\n\nnvme_tcp_create_ctrl()\n nvme_tcp_alloc_ctrl() new=true ... Alloc nvme_tcp_ctrl and admin_tag_set\n nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() new=true\n nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=true ... Succeed\n nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() ... Alloc the tag set for admin_tag_set\n nvme_stop_keep_alive()\n nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() remove=false\n nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=false\n nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue() ... Fail, but do not call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set()\n nvme_uninit_ctrl()\n nvme_put_ctrl() ... Free up the nvme_tcp_ctrl and admin_tag_set\n\nThe first call of nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() succeeds with\nnew=true argument. The second call fails with new=false argument. This\nsecond call does not call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() on failure, due to\nthe new=false argument. Then the admin tag set is not removed. However,\nnvme_tcp_create_ctrl() assumes that nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() would call\nnvme_remove_admin_tag_set(). Then it frees up struct nvme_tcp_ctrl which\nhas admin_tag_set field. Later on, the timeout handler accesses the\nadmin_tag_set field and causes the BUG KASAN slab-use-after-free.\n\nTo not leave the admin tag set, call nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() when\nthe second nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() call fails. Do not return\nfrom nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() on failure. Instead, jump to \"destroy_admin\"\ngo-to label to call nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() which calls\nnvme_remove_admin_tag_set()."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: nvme-tcp: eliminar el conjunto de etiquetas cuando falla la configuraci\u00f3n de la segunda cola de administraci\u00f3n. El commit 104d0e2f6222 (\"nvme-fabrics: restablecer la conexi\u00f3n de administraci\u00f3n para una concatenaci\u00f3n segura\") modific\u00f3 nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() para llamar a nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() dos veces. La primera llamada prepara la negociaci\u00f3n DH-CHAP y la segunda es necesaria para la concatenaci\u00f3n segura. Sin embargo, este cambio activ\u00f3 el error \"slab-use-after-free\" en blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter()\". Este error se puede recrear repitiendo el caso de prueba blktests nvme/063 varias veces [1]. Cuando ocurre el ERROR, nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() falla en la siguiente cadena de llamadas: nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() nvme_tcp_alloc_ctrl() new=true ... Asignar nvme_tcp_ctrl y admin_tag_set nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() new=true nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=true ... Correcto nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() ... Asignar el conjunto de etiquetas para admin_tag_set nvme_stop_keep_alive() nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue() remove=false nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() new=false nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue() ... Falla, pero no se llama nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() nvme_uninit_ctrl() nvme_put_ctrl() ... Libera nvme_tcp_ctrl y admin_tag_set La primera llamada de nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue() tiene \u00e9xito con el argumento new=true. La segunda llamada falla con el argumento new=false. Esta segunda llamada no llama a nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() en caso de error, debido al argumento new=false. Entonces, el conjunto de etiquetas admin no se elimina. Sin embargo, nvme_tcp_create_ctrl() supone que nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() llamar\u00eda a nvme_remove_admin_tag_set(). Luego libera la estructura nvme_tcp_ctrl que tiene el campo admin_tag_set. Posteriormente, el controlador de tiempo de espera accede al campo admin_tag_set y provoca el error \"BUG KASAN slab-use-after-free\". Para mantener la etiqueta admin activa, llame a nvme_remove_admin_tag_set() cuando falle la segunda llamada a nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue(). No regrese de nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl() en caso de error. En su lugar, vaya a la etiqueta \"destroy_admin\" para llamar a nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue(), que a su vez llama a nvme_remove_admin_tag_set()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-38209",
"lastModified": "2026-10-15T22:18:35.113",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-38209",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:48:31.130301Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-07-04T14:15:29.080",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db1da838b6012e4570c6f81e28ffe1d0ff595948"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7143706702a209c814ed2c3fc6486c2a7decf6c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.