FKIE_CVE-2025-32797
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-06-16 19:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:12| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| anaconda | conda-build | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "conda-build",
"vendor": "conda",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 25.3.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:anaconda:conda-build:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CB06ECE3-3052-465B-88B2-B7BF8AC9249D",
"versionEndExcluding": "25.3.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Conda-build contains commands and tools to build conda packages. Prior to version 25.3.1, the write_build_scripts function in conda-build creates the temporary build script conda_build.sh with overly permissive file permissions (0o766), allowing write access to all users. Attackers with filesystem access can exploit a race condition to overwrite the script before execution, enabling arbitrary code execution under the victim\u0027s privileges. This risk is significant in shared environments, potentially leading to full system compromise. Even with non-static directory names, attackers can monitor parent directories for file creation events. The brief window between script creation (with insecure permissions) and execution allows rapid overwrites. Directory names can also be inferred via timestamps or logs, and automation enables exploitation even with semi-randomized paths by acting within milliseconds of detection. This issue has been patched in version 25.3.1. A workaround involves restricting conda_build.sh permissions from 0o766 to 0o700 (owner-only read/write/execute). Additionally, use atomic file creation (write to a temporary randomized filename and rename atomically) to minimize the race condition window."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Conda-build contiene comandos y herramientas para compilar paquetes conda. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 25.3.1, la funci\u00f3n write_build_scripts de conda-build creaba el script de compilaci\u00f3n temporal conda_build.sh con permisos de archivo excesivamente permisivos (0o766), lo que permit\u00eda el acceso de escritura a todos los usuarios. Los atacantes con acceso al sistema de archivos pod\u00edan explotar una condici\u00f3n de ejecuci\u00f3n para sobrescribir el script antes de su ejecuci\u00f3n, lo que permit\u00eda la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo arbitrario con los privilegios de la v\u00edctima. Este riesgo es significativo en entornos compartidos y podr\u00eda comprometer por completo el sistema. Incluso con nombres de directorio no est\u00e1ticos, los atacantes pueden monitorizar los directorios principales para detectar eventos de creaci\u00f3n de archivos. El breve intervalo entre la creaci\u00f3n del script (con permisos inseguros) y su ejecuci\u00f3n permite sobrescrituras r\u00e1pidas. Los nombres de directorio tambi\u00e9n se pueden inferir mediante marcas de tiempo o registros, y la automatizaci\u00f3n permite la explotaci\u00f3n incluso con rutas semi-aleatorizadas al actuar en milisegundos tras la detecci\u00f3n. Este problema se ha corregido en la versi\u00f3n 25.3.1. Una soluci\u00f3n alternativa consiste en restringir los permisos de conda_build.sh de 0o766 a 0o700 (solo lectura, escritura y ejecuci\u00f3n del propietario). Adem\u00e1s, utilice la creaci\u00f3n at\u00f3mica de archivos (escribir en un nombre de archivo temporal aleatorio y renombrarlo autom\u00e1ticamente) para minimizar la ventana de condici\u00f3n de ejecuci\u00f3n."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-32797",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:12:35.407",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.0,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.0,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-32797",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-06-17T13:56:56.517803Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-06-16T19:15:33.510",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/conda/conda-build/blob/3f06913bba22c4e1ef1065df9e00d86ac97f087c/conda_build/build.py#L3054-L3084"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/conda/conda-build/commit/d246e49c8f45e8033915156ee3d77769926f3c2e"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/conda/conda-build/pull/5"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/conda/conda-build/security/advisories/GHSA-vfp6-3v8g-vcmm"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-277"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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