FKIE_CVE-2025-30095
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-03-31 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:08| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "VyOS",
"vendor": "VyOS",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.4.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.5-stream-2025-Q2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.5",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "VyOS 1.3 through 1.5 (fixed in 1.4.2) or any Debian-based system using dropbear in combination with live-build has the same Dropbear private host keys across different installations. Thus, an attacker can conduct active man-in-the-middle attacks against SSH connections if Dropbear is enabled as the SSH daemon. I n VyOS, this is not the default configuration for the system SSH daemon, but is for the console service. To mitigate this, one can run \"rm -f /etc/dropbear/*key*\" and/or \"rm -f /etc/dropbear-initramfs/*key*\" and then dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 -f /etc/dropbear_rsa_host_key and reload the service or reboot the system before using Dropbear as the SSH daemon (this clears out all keys mistakenly built into the release image) or update to the latest version of VyOS 1.4 or 1.5. Note that this vulnerability is not unique to VyOS and may appear in any Debian-based Linux distribution that uses Dropbear in combination with live-build, which has a safeguard against this behavior in OpenSSH but no equivalent one for Dropbear."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "VyOS 1.3 a 1.5 (corregida en 1.4.2) o cualquier sistema basado en Debian que utilice dropbear en combinaci\u00f3n con live-build tiene las mismas claves de host privadas de Dropbear en diferentes instalaciones. Por lo tanto, un atacante puede realizar ataques de intermediario activos contra conexiones SSH si Dropbear est\u00e1 habilitado como daemon SSH. En VyOS, esta no es la configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada para el daemon SSH del sistema, sino para el servicio de consola. Para mitigar esto, se puede ejecutar \"rm -f /etc/dropbear/*key*\" o \"rm -f /etc/dropbear-initramfs/*key*\" y luego \"dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 -f /etc/dropbear_rsa_host_key\" y recargar el servicio o reiniciar el sistema antes de usar Dropbear como daemon SSH (esto borra todas las claves integradas por error en la imagen de lanzamiento) o actualizar a la \u00faltima versi\u00f3n de VyOS 1.4 o 1.5. Tenga en cuenta que esta vulnerabilidad no es exclusiva de VyOS y puede aparecer en cualquier distribuci\u00f3n de Linux basada en Debian que use Dropbear en combinaci\u00f3n con live-build, que cuenta con una protecci\u00f3n contra este comportamiento en OpenSSH, pero no con una equivalente para Dropbear."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-30095",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:08:09.230",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-30095",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-03-31T21:08:55.093564Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-03-31T15:15:44.843",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://blog.vyos.io/vyos-project-march-2025-update"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://blog.vyos.io/vyos-stream-1.5-2025-q1"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://github.com/vyos/"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://vyos.dev/T7217"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://vyos.net/get/stream/#1.5-2025-Q1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-321"
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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