FKIE_CVE-2025-29922
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-03-20 18:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:05| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "kcp",
"vendor": "kcp-dev",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.26.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "kcp is a Kubernetes-like control plane for form-factors and use-cases beyond Kubernetes and container workloads. Prior to 0.26.3, the identified vulnerability allows creating or deleting an object via the APIExport VirtualWorkspace in any arbitrary target workspace for pre-existing resources. By design, this should only be allowed when the workspace owner decides to give access to an API provider by creating an APIBinding. With this vulnerability, it is possible for an attacker to create and delete objects even if none of these requirements are satisfied, i.e. even if there is no APIBinding in that workspace at all or the workspace owner has created an APIBinding, but rejected a permission claim. A fix for this issue has been identified and has been published with kcp 0.26.3 and 0.27.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "kcp es un plano de control similar a Kubernetes para formatos y casos de uso m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de Kubernetes y cargas de trabajo de contenedores. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.26.3, la vulnerabilidad identificada permit\u00eda crear o eliminar un objeto mediante APIExport VirtualWorkspace en cualquier espacio de trabajo de destino arbitrario para recursos preexistentes. Por dise\u00f1o, esto solo deber\u00eda permitirse cuando el propietario del espacio de trabajo decide otorgar acceso a un proveedor de API mediante la creaci\u00f3n de un APIBinding. Con esta vulnerabilidad, un atacante puede crear y eliminar objetos incluso si no se cumple ninguno de estos requisitos; es decir, incluso si no existe ning\u00fan APIBinding en ese espacio de trabajo o si el propietario del espacio de trabajo ha creado un APIBinding, pero ha rechazado una solicitud de permiso. Se ha identificado una soluci\u00f3n para este problema y se ha publicado en kcp 0.26.3 y 0.27.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-29922",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:05:53.080",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.6,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-29922",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-03-20T18:15:51.138004Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-03-20T18:15:19.063",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/614ecbf35f11db00f65391ab6fbb1547ca8b5d38"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/pull/3338"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/security/advisories/GHSA-w2rr-38wv-8rrp"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-285"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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