FKIE_CVE-2025-27106
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-02-21 22:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:03
Severity
Summary
binance-trading-bot is an automated Binance trading bot with trailing buy/sell strategy. Authenticated users of binance-trading-bot can achieve Remote Code Execution on the host system due to a command injection vulnerability in the `/restore` endpoint. The restore endpoint of binance-trading-bot is vulnerable to command injection via the `/restore` endpoint. The name of the uploaded file is passed to shell.exec without sanitization other than path normalization, resulting in Remote Code Execution. This may allow any authorized user to execute code in the context of the host machine. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.100 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "binance-trading-bot",
"vendor": "chrisleekr",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.0.100"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "binance-trading-bot is an automated Binance trading bot with trailing buy/sell strategy. Authenticated users of binance-trading-bot can achieve Remote Code Execution on the host system due to a command injection vulnerability in the `/restore` endpoint. The restore endpoint of binance-trading-bot is vulnerable to command injection via the `/restore` endpoint. The name of the uploaded file is passed to shell.exec without sanitization other than path normalization, resulting in Remote Code Execution. This may allow any authorized user to execute code in the context of the host machine. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.100 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "binance-trading-bot es un bot de trading automatizado de Binance con una estrategia de compra/venta de seguimiento. Los usuarios autenticados de binance-trading-bot pueden lograr la ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo en el sistema host debido a una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n de comandos en el endpoint `/restore`. El endpoint de restauraci\u00f3n de binance-trading-bot es vulnerable a la inyecci\u00f3n de comandos a trav\u00e9s del endpoint `/restore`. El nombre del archivo cargado se pasa a shell.exec sin ninguna depuraci\u00f3n m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la normalizaci\u00f3n de la ruta, lo que da como resultado la ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo. Esto puede permitir que cualquier usuario autorizado ejecute c\u00f3digo en el contexto de la m\u00e1quina host. Este problema se ha solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.0.100 y se recomienda a todos los usuarios que actualicen. No existen workarounds conocidos para esta vulnerabilidad."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-27106",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:03:02.697",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-27106",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-02-22T15:39:03.866155Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-02-21T22:15:14.033",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chrisleekr/binance-trading-bot/blob/dd8e1a91b872a48aec47bbe1280c1c6ea96784d9/app/frontend/webserver/handlers/restore-post.js#L14"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chrisleekr/binance-trading-bot/commit/99d464cf8ef858d441189993054ec5f5f86e6213"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chrisleekr/binance-trading-bot/security/advisories/GHSA-wq6j-4388-4gg5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-78"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.