FKIE_CVE-2025-12624
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-16 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-07 09:105.4 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| wso2 | identity_server | 5.2.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "WSO2 Identity Server",
"vendor": "WSO2",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5.2.0",
"status": "unknown",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.2.0.35",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.2.0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wso2:identity_server:5.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "2689AF3E-01AA-4B79-BA55-6BB3D81E16CF",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Active access tokens are not revoked or invalidated when a user account is locked within WSO2 Identity Server. This failure to enforce revocation allows previously issued, valid tokens to remain usable, enabling continued access to protected resources by locked user accounts.\n\nThe security consequence is that a locked user account can maintain access to protected resources through the use of existing, unexpired access tokens. This creates a security gap where access control policies are bypassed, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or actions until the tokens naturally expire."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Los tokens de acceso activos no son revocados o invalidados cuando una cuenta de usuario es bloqueada dentro de WSO2 Identity Server. Esta falla en aplicar la revocaci\u00f3n permite que los tokens v\u00e1lidos, emitidos previamente, permanezcan utilizables, posibilitando el acceso continuo a recursos protegidos por cuentas de usuario bloqueadas.\n\nLa consecuencia de seguridad es que una cuenta de usuario bloqueada puede mantener el acceso a recursos protegidos mediante el uso de tokens de acceso existentes y no caducados. Esto crea una brecha de seguridad donde las pol\u00edticas de control de acceso son eludidas, lo que podr\u00eda llevar a un acceso no autorizado a datos o acciones hasta que los tokens caduquen de forma natural."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-12624",
"lastModified": "2026-10-07T09:10:00.160",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.0,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.7,
"source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 2.5,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-12624",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-16T12:19:51.834842Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-16T11:16:26.447",
"references": [
{
"source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://security.docs.wso2.com/en/latest/security-announcements/security-advisories/2026/WSO2-2025-4684/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-613"
}
],
"source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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