FKIE_CVE-2025-10657

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-26 21:15 - Updated: 2026-10-09 10:10
Severity
8.7 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Summary
In a hardened Docker environment, with Enhanced Container Isolation ( ECI https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/ ) enabled, an administrator can utilize the command restrictions feature https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/config/#command-restrictions  to restrict commands that a container with a Docker socket mount may issue on that socket. Due to a software bug, the configuration to restrict commands was ignored when passed to ECI, allowing any command to be executed on the socket. This grants excessive privileges by permitting unrestricted access to powerful Docker commands. The vulnerability affects only Docker Desktop 4.46.0 users that have ECI enabled and are using the Docker socket command restrictions feature. In addition, since ECI restricts mounting the Docker socket into containers by default, it only affects containers which are explicitly allowed by the administrator to mount the Docker socket.
References
security@docker.comhttps://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "platforms": [
            "Windows",
            "MacOS",
            "Linux"
          ],
          "product": "Docker Desktop",
          "vendor": "Docker",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.46.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@docker.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In a hardened Docker environment, with Enhanced Container Isolation ( ECI https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/ ) enabled, an administrator can utilize the command restrictions  feature https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/config/#command-restrictions \u00a0to restrict commands that a container with a Docker socket mount may issue on that socket.\nDue to a software bug, the configuration to restrict commands was ignored when passed to ECI, allowing any command to be executed on the socket. This grants excessive privileges by permitting unrestricted access to powerful Docker commands.\n\nThe vulnerability affects only Docker Desktop 4.46.0 users that have ECI enabled and are using the Docker socket command restrictions feature. In addition, since ECI restricts mounting the Docker socket into containers by default, it only affects containers which are explicitly allowed by the administrator to mount the Docker socket."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En un entorno Docker reforzado, con Aislamiento Mejorado de Contenedores (ECI https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/) habilitado, un administrador puede utilizar la funci\u00f3n de restricciones de comandos https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/config/#command-restrictions para restringir los comandos que un contenedor con un montaje de socket Docker puede emitir en ese socket.\nDebido a un error de software, la configuraci\u00f3n para restringir comandos fue ignorada al pasarse a ECI, permitiendo que cualquier comando se ejecutara en el socket. Esto otorga privilegios excesivos al permitir acceso sin restricciones a comandos Docker potentes.\n\nLa vulnerabilidad afecta solo a los usuarios de Docker Desktop 4.46.0 que tienen ECI habilitado y est\u00e1n utilizando la funci\u00f3n de restricciones de comandos del socket Docker. Adem\u00e1s, dado que ECI restringe el montaje del socket Docker en contenedores por defecto, solo afecta a los contenedores a los que el administrador permite expl\u00edcitamente montar el socket Docker."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-10657",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-09T10:10:00.193",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security@docker.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-10657",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2025-09-30T03:55:09.163759Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-09-26T21:15:34.657",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@docker.com",
      "url": "https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@docker.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@docker.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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