FKIE_CVE-2025-10543
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-02 09:15 - Updated: 2026-10-18 18:10
Severity
Summary
In Eclipse Paho Go MQTT v3.1 library (paho.mqtt.golang) versions <=1.5.0 UTF-8 encoded strings, passed into the library, may be incorrectly encoded if their length exceeds 65535 bytes. This may lead to unexpected content in packets sent to the server (for example, part of an MQTT topic may leak into the message body in a PUBLISH packet).
The issue arises because the length of the data passed in was converted from an int64/int32 (depending upon CPU) to an int16 without checks for overflows. The int16 length was then written, followed by the data (e.g. topic). This meant that when the data (e.g. topic) was over 65535 bytes then the amount of data written exceeds what the length field indicates. This could lead to a corrupt packet, or mean that the excess data leaks into another field (e.g. topic leaks into message body).
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| emo@eclipse.org | https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/254 | Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "paho.mqtt.golang (Go MQTT v3.1 library)",
"vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.5.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:eclipse:paho_mqtt:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7EF727B3-5150-4C1A-8C5B-35B244E78E71",
"versionEndIncluding": "1.5.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In Eclipse Paho Go MQTT v3.1 library (paho.mqtt.golang) versions \u003c=1.5.0 UTF-8 encoded strings, passed into the library, may be incorrectly encoded if their length exceeds 65535 bytes. This may lead to unexpected content in packets sent to the server (for example, part of an MQTT topic may leak into the message body in a PUBLISH packet).\n\n\nThe issue arises because the length of the data passed in was converted from an int64/int32 (depending upon CPU) to an int16 without checks for overflows. The int16 length was then written, followed by the data (e.g. topic). This meant that when the data (e.g. topic) was over 65535 bytes then the amount of data written exceeds what the length field indicates. This could lead to a corrupt packet, or mean that the excess data leaks into another field (e.g. topic leaks into message body)."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En las versiones menor o igual que 1.5.0 de la biblioteca Eclipse Paho Go MQTT v3.1 (paho.mqtt.golang), las cadenas codificadas en UTF-8, pasadas a la biblioteca, pueden codificarse incorrectamente si su longitud excede los 65535 bytes. Esto puede llevar a contenido inesperado en los paquetes enviados al servidor (por ejemplo, parte de un tema MQTT puede filtrarse en el cuerpo del mensaje en un paquete PUBLISH).\n\nEl problema surge porque la longitud de los datos pasados se convirti\u00f3 de un int64/int32 (dependiendo de la CPU) a un int16 sin comprobaciones de desbordamientos. La longitud int16 se escribi\u00f3 entonces, seguida de los datos (por ejemplo, el tema). Esto significaba que cuando los datos (por ejemplo, el tema) superaban los 65535 bytes, entonces la cantidad de datos escritos exced\u00eda lo que indicaba el campo de longitud. Esto podr\u00eda llevar a un paquete corrupto, o significar que el exceso de datos se filtra en otro campo (por ejemplo, el tema se filtra en el cuerpo del mensaje)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-10543",
"lastModified": "2026-10-18T18:10:00.100",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-10543",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-12-02T13:55:40.279700Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-02T09:15:46.127",
"references": [
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/254"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "emo@eclipse.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-197"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-681"
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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