FKIE_CVE-2024-8939
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-09-17 17:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:23| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "vllm",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.5.0.post1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhelai1/bootc-nvidia-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux_ai:1"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "rhelai1/instructlab-nvidia-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI)",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A vulnerability was found in the ilab model serve component, where improper handling of the best_of parameter in the vllm JSON web API can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS). The API used for LLM-based sentence or chat completion accepts a best_of parameter to return the best completion from several options. When this parameter is set to a large value, the API does not handle timeouts or resource exhaustion properly, allowing an attacker to cause a DoS by consuming excessive system resources. This leads to the API becoming unresponsive, preventing legitimate users from accessing the service."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Se encontr\u00f3 una vulnerabilidad en el componente de servicio de modelos ilab, donde el manejo inadecuado del par\u00e1metro best_of en la API web JSON vllm puede provocar una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio (DoS). La API utilizada para completar oraciones o chats basados en LLM acepta un par\u00e1metro best_of para devolver la mejor opci\u00f3n de varias opciones. Cuando este par\u00e1metro se establece en un valor alto, la API no maneja los tiempos de espera o el agotamiento de recursos de manera adecuada, lo que permite que un atacante provoque una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio al consumir recursos excesivos del sistema. Esto hace que la API deje de responder, lo que impide que los usuarios leg\u00edtimos accedan al servicio."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-8939",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:23:35.693",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.2,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.5,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-8939",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-09-17T19:51:11.286179Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-09-17T17:15:11.327",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-8939"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2312782"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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