FKIE_CVE-2024-56560

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-12-27 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:12
Severity
5.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slab: Fix too strict alignment check in create_cache() On m68k, where the minimum alignment of unsigned long is 2 bytes: Kernel panic - not syncing: __kmem_cache_create_args: Failed to create slab 'io_kiocb'. Error -22 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.12.0-atari-03776-g7eaa1f99261a #1783 Stack from 0102fe5c: 0102fe5c 00514a2b 00514a2b ffffff00 00000001 0051f5ed 00425e78 00514a2b 0041eb74 ffffffea 00000310 0051f5ed ffffffea ffffffea 00601f60 00000044 0102ff20 000e7a68 0051ab8e 004383b8 0051f5ed ffffffea 000000b8 00000007 01020c00 00000000 000e77f0 0041e5f0 005f67c0 0051f5ed 000000b6 0102fef4 00000310 0102fef4 00000000 00000016 005f676c 0060a34c 00000010 00000004 00000038 0000009a 01000000 000000b8 005f668e 0102e000 00001372 0102ff88 Call Trace: [<00425e78>] dump_stack+0xc/0x10 [<0041eb74>] panic+0xd8/0x26c [<000e7a68>] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x278/0x2e8 [<000e77f0>] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x0/0x2e8 [<0041e5f0>] memset+0x0/0x8c [<005f67c0>] io_uring_init+0x54/0xd2 The minimal alignment of an integral type may differ from its size, hence is not safe to assume that an arbitrary freeptr_t (which is basically an unsigned long) is always aligned to 4 or 8 bytes. As nothing seems to require the additional alignment, it is safe to fix this by relaxing the check to the actual minimum alignment of freeptr_t.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b5aea5e5186733fa4e5aa4293b0a65a933f1a16Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9008fe8fad8255edfdbecea32d7eb0485d939d0dPatch
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/slab_common.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "8b5aea5e5186733fa4e5aa4293b0a65a933f1a16",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d345bd2e9834e2da505977e154a1c179c793b7b2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9008fe8fad8255edfdbecea32d7eb0485d939d0d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d345bd2e9834e2da505977e154a1c179c793b7b2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/slab_common.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.13",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "938626A1-5477-4679-A5E2-2AADE66DEDCA",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.4",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.12",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nslab: Fix too strict alignment check in create_cache()\n\nOn m68k, where the minimum alignment of unsigned long is 2 bytes:\n\n    Kernel panic - not syncing: __kmem_cache_create_args: Failed to create slab \u0027io_kiocb\u0027. Error -22\n    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.12.0-atari-03776-g7eaa1f99261a #1783\n    Stack from 0102fe5c:\n\t    0102fe5c 00514a2b 00514a2b ffffff00 00000001 0051f5ed 00425e78 00514a2b\n\t    0041eb74 ffffffea 00000310 0051f5ed ffffffea ffffffea 00601f60 00000044\n\t    0102ff20 000e7a68 0051ab8e 004383b8 0051f5ed ffffffea 000000b8 00000007\n\t    01020c00 00000000 000e77f0 0041e5f0 005f67c0 0051f5ed 000000b6 0102fef4\n\t    00000310 0102fef4 00000000 00000016 005f676c 0060a34c 00000010 00000004\n\t    00000038 0000009a 01000000 000000b8 005f668e 0102e000 00001372 0102ff88\n    Call Trace: [\u003c00425e78\u003e] dump_stack+0xc/0x10\n     [\u003c0041eb74\u003e] panic+0xd8/0x26c\n     [\u003c000e7a68\u003e] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x278/0x2e8\n     [\u003c000e77f0\u003e] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x0/0x2e8\n     [\u003c0041e5f0\u003e] memset+0x0/0x8c\n     [\u003c005f67c0\u003e] io_uring_init+0x54/0xd2\n\nThe minimal alignment of an integral type may differ from its size,\nhence is not safe to assume that an arbitrary freeptr_t (which is\nbasically an unsigned long) is always aligned to 4 or 8 bytes.\n\nAs nothing seems to require the additional alignment, it is safe to fix\nthis by relaxing the check to the actual minimum alignment of freeptr_t."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: slab: Se corrige una comprobaci\u00f3n de alineaci\u00f3n demasiado estricta en create_cache() En m68k, donde la alineaci\u00f3n m\u00ednima de unsigned long es de 2 bytes: P\u00e1nico del kernel: no se sincroniza: __kmem_cache_create_args: No se pudo crear slab \u0027io_kiocb\u0027. Error -22 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper No contaminado 6.12.0-atari-03776-g7eaa1f99261a #1783 Pila de 0102fe5c: 0102fe5c 00514a2b 00514a2b ffffff00 00000001 0051f5ed 00425e78 00514a2b 0041eb74 ffffffea 00000310 0051f5ed ffffffea ffffffea 00601f60 00000044 0102ff20 000e7a68 0051ab8e 004383b8 0051f5ed ffffffea 000000b8 00000007 01020c00 00000000 000e77f0 0041e5f0 005f67c0 0051f5ed 000000b6 0102fef4 00000310 0102fef4 00000000 00000016 005f676c 0060a34c 00000010 00000004 00000038 0000009a 01000000 000000b8 005f668e 0102e000 00001372 0102ff88 Seguimiento de llamadas: [\u0026lt;00425e78\u0026gt;] dump_stack+0xc/0x10 [\u0026lt;0041eb74\u0026gt;] panic+0xd8/0x26c [\u0026lt;000e7a68\u0026gt;] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x278/0x2e8 [\u0026lt;000e77f0\u0026gt;] __kmem_cache_create_args+0x0/0x2e8 [\u0026lt;0041e5f0\u0026gt;] memset+0x0/0x8c [\u0026lt;005f67c0\u0026gt;] io_uring_init+0x54/0xd2 La alineaci\u00f3n m\u00ednima de un tipo integral puede diferir de su tama\u00f1o, por lo tanto, no es seguro asumir que un freeptr_t arbitrario (que es b\u00e1sicamente un unsigned long) siempre est\u00e1 alineado a 4 u 8 bytes. Como nada parece requerir una alineaci\u00f3n adicional, es seguro solucionar esto relajando la verificaci\u00f3n a la alineaci\u00f3n m\u00ednima real de freeptr_t."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-56560",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:12:25.013",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 5.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-12-27T15:15:14.873",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b5aea5e5186733fa4e5aa4293b0a65a933f1a16"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9008fe8fad8255edfdbecea32d7eb0485d939d0d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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