FKIE_CVE-2024-53861
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-11-29 19:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:097.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| pyjwt_project | pyjwt | 2.10.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "pyjwt",
"vendor": "jpadilla",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "= 2.10.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:pyjwt_project:pyjwt:2.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "pyjwt",
"vendor": "pyjwt_project",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.10.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:pyjwt_project:pyjwt:2.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "969521B6-ABE6-4B43-A063-56C58904F8ED",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "pyjwt is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. An incorrect string comparison is run for `iss` checking, resulting in `\"acb\"` being accepted for `\"_abc_\"`. This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the \"iss\" claim changed from `isinstance(issuer, list)` to `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, `in` is also used for string comparison. This results in `if \"abc\" not in \"__abcd__\":` being checked instead of `if \"abc\" != \"__abc__\":`. Signature checks are still present so real world impact is likely limited to denial of service scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 2.10.1. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "pyjwt es una implementaci\u00f3n de JSON Web Token en Python. Se ejecuta una comparaci\u00f3n de cadena incorrecta para la comprobaci\u00f3n de `iss`, lo que da como resultado que `\"acb\"` se acepte en lugar de `\"_abc_\"`. Este es un error introducido en la versi\u00f3n 2.10.0: la comprobaci\u00f3n de la reclamaci\u00f3n \"iss\" cambi\u00f3 de `isinstance(issuer, list)` a `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. Dado que str es una secuencia, pero no una lista, `in` tambi\u00e9n se utiliza para la comparaci\u00f3n de cadenas. Esto da como resultado que se compruebe `if \"abc\" not in \"__abcd__\":` en lugar de `if \"abc\" != \"__abc__\":`. Las comprobaciones de firma a\u00fan est\u00e1n presentes, por lo que es probable que el impacto en el mundo real se limite a escenarios de denegaci\u00f3n de servicio. Este problema se ha corregido en la versi\u00f3n 2.10.1. Se recomienda a todos los usuarios que actualicen. No existen workarounds conocidos para esta vulnerabilidad."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-53861",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:09:25.893",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.2,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.7,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-53861",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-12-02T11:10:51.855024Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-11-29T19:15:09.433",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/1570e708672aa9036bc772476beae8bfa48f4131#diff-6893ad4a1c5a36b8af3028db8c8bc3b62418149843fc382faf901eaab008e380R366"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/33022c25525c1020869c71ce2a4109e44ae4ced1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-75c5-xw7c-p5pm"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-697"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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