FKIE_CVE-2024-53222
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-12-27 14:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:08
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show()
LTP reported a NULL pointer dereference as followed:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram]
sp : ffff800088b93b90
x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0
x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9 : ffff80007b3cb280
x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
__pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140
comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram]
dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140
kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48
seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8
kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x40/0x58
new_sync_read+0x9c/0x168
vfs_read+0x1a8/0x1f8
ksys_read+0x74/0x108
__arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0x138
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
The zram->comp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] can be NULL in zram_add() if
comp_algorithm_set() has not been called. User can access the zram device
by sysfs after device_add_disk(), so there is a time window to trigger the
NULL pointer dereference. Move it ahead device_add_disk() to make sure
when user can access the zram device, it is ready. comp_algorithm_set()
is protected by zram->init_lock in other places and no such problem.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "c7ee791e538537b281f60945298796f0a3971bbd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7ac07a26dea79c3892436bce41cce03dcbd3c4c7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "843d366ff19708668d95cda16bb8aba109a93dba",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7ac07a26dea79c3892436bce41cce03dcbd3c4c7",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f364cdeb38938f9d03061682b8ff3779dd1730e5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7ac07a26dea79c3892436bce41cce03dcbd3c4c7",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.84",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.13",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F21702AB-90B0-49AB-83E6-29B799AF41C7",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nzram: fix NULL pointer in comp_algorithm_show()\n\nLTP reported a NULL pointer dereference as followed:\n\n CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6+ #3\n Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140\n lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram]\n sp : ffff800088b93b90\n x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0\n x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 0000000000000000\n x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900\n x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000\n x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000\n x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9 : ffff80007b3cb280\n x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000\n x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000\n Call trace:\n __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140\n comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram]\n dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80\n sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140\n kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48\n seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8\n kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x40/0x58\n new_sync_read+0x9c/0x168\n vfs_read+0x1a8/0x1f8\n ksys_read+0x74/0x108\n __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x38\n invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0\n do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38\n el0_svc+0x38/0x138\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8\n el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190\n\nThe zram-\u003ecomp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] can be NULL in zram_add() if\ncomp_algorithm_set() has not been called. User can access the zram device\nby sysfs after device_add_disk(), so there is a time window to trigger the\nNULL pointer dereference. Move it ahead device_add_disk() to make sure\nwhen user can access the zram device, it is ready. comp_algorithm_set()\nis protected by zram-\u003einit_lock in other places and no such problem."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: zram: arregla el puntero NULL en comp_algorithm_show() LTP inform\u00f3 una desreferencia de puntero NULL de la siguiente manera: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 5995 Comm: cat Kdump: cargado No contaminado 6.12.0-rc6+ #3 Nombre del hardware: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140 lr : zcomp_available_show+0x60/0x100 [zram] sp : ffff800088b93b90 x29: ffff800088b93b90 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0 x26: 0000000000000ffe x25: ffff80007b3e2388 x24: 00000000000000000 x23: ffff80007b3e2390 x22: ffff0004041a9000 x21: ffff80007b3e2900 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 00000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80007b3e2900 x9: ffff80007b3cb280 x8: 0101010101010101 x7: 0000000000000000 x6: 0000000000000000 x5: 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00656c722d6f7a6c x2 : 000000000000000 x1 : ffff80007b3e2900 x0 : 0000000000000000 Rastreo de llamadas: __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140 comp_algorithm_show+0x40/0x70 [zram] dev_attr_show+0x28/0x80 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x90/0x140 kernfs_seq_show+0x34/0x48 seq_read_iter+0x1d4/0x4e8 El zram-\u0026gt;comp_algs[ZRAM_PRIMARY_COMP] puede ser NULL en zram_add() si No se ha llamado a comp_algorithm_set(). El usuario puede acceder al dispositivo zram mediante sysfs despu\u00e9s de device_add_disk(), por lo que hay una ventana de tiempo para activar la desreferencia del puntero NULL. Mu\u00e9valo hacia delante en device_add_disk() para asegurarse de que cuando el usuario pueda acceder al dispositivo zram, est\u00e9 listo. comp_algorithm_set() est\u00e1 protegido por zram-\u0026gt;init_lock en otros lugares y no existe ese problema."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-53222",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:08:37.960",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2024-12-27T14:15:30.327",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/843d366ff19708668d95cda16bb8aba109a93dba"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7ee791e538537b281f60945298796f0a3971bbd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f364cdeb38938f9d03061682b8ff3779dd1730e5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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