FKIE_CVE-2024-49931
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-10-21 18:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:00| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp_rx.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "d0e4274d9dc9f8409d56d622cd3ecf7b6fd49e2f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d889913205cf7ebda905b1e62c5867ed4e39f6c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a4aef827a41cdaf6201bbaf773c1eae4e20e967b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d889913205cf7ebda905b1e62c5867ed4e39f6c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ad791e3ec60cb66c1e4dc121ffbf872df312427d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d889913205cf7ebda905b1e62c5867ed4e39f6c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e106b7ad13c1d246adaa57df73edb8f8b8acb240",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d889913205cf7ebda905b1e62c5867ed4e39f6c2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp_rx.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.10.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.11.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.11.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "8B527B5F-BDDA-424E-932E-16FCAAB575E2",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.55",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4C16BCE0-FFA0-4599-BE0A-1FD65101C021",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.10.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "54D9C704-D679-41A7-9C40-10A6B1E7FFE9",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.11.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath12k: fix array out-of-bound access in SoC stats\n\nCurrently, the ath12k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error array is defined with a\nmaximum size of DP_REO_DST_RING_MAX. However, the ath12k_dp_rx_process()\nfunction access ath12k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error using the REO\ndestination SRNG ring ID, which is incorrect. SRNG ring ID differ from\nnormal ring ID, and this usage leads to out-of-bounds array access. To\nfix this issue, modify ath12k_dp_rx_process() to use the normal ring ID\ndirectly instead of the SRNG ring ID to avoid out-of-bounds array access.\n\nTested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0.1-00029-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: ath12k: arreglo de acceso fuera de los l\u00edmites a la matriz en las estad\u00edsticas de SoC Actualmente, la matriz ath12k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error est\u00e1 definida con un tama\u00f1o m\u00e1ximo de DP_REO_DST_RING_MAX. Sin embargo, la funci\u00f3n ath12k_dp_rx_process() accede a ath12k_soc_dp_stats::hal_reo_error utilizando el ID de anillo SRNG de destino REO, lo cual es incorrecto. El ID de anillo SRNG difiere del ID de anillo normal, y este uso conduce a un acceso a la matriz fuera de los l\u00edmites. Para solucionar este problema, modifique ath12k_dp_rx_process() para utilizar el ID de anillo normal directamente en lugar del ID de anillo SRNG para evitar el acceso a la matriz fuera de los l\u00edmites. Probado en: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0.1-00029-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-49931",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:00:45.530",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-49931",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-10-22T13:39:04.073655Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-10-21T18:15:15.080",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4aef827a41cdaf6201bbaf773c1eae4e20e967b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad791e3ec60cb66c1e4dc121ffbf872df312427d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0e4274d9dc9f8409d56d622cd3ecf7b6fd49e2f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e106b7ad13c1d246adaa57df73edb8f8b8acb240"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-129"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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