FKIE_CVE-2024-49888
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-10-21 18:15 - Updated: 2026-10-21 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a sdiv overflow issue
Zac Ecob reported a problem where a bpf program may cause kernel crash due
to the following error:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
The failure is due to the below signed divide:
LLONG_MIN/-1 where LLONG_MIN equals to -9,223,372,036,854,775,808.
LLONG_MIN/-1 is supposed to give a positive number 9,223,372,036,854,775,808,
but it is impossible since for 64-bit system, the maximum positive
number is 9,223,372,036,854,775,807. On x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 will
cause a kernel exception. On arm64, the result for LLONG_MIN/-1 is
LLONG_MIN.
Further investigation found all the following sdiv/smod cases may trigger
an exception when bpf program is running on x86_64 platform:
- LLONG_MIN/-1 for 64bit operation
- INT_MIN/-1 for 32bit operation
- LLONG_MIN%-1 for 64bit operation
- INT_MIN%-1 for 32bit operation
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.
On arm64, there are no exceptions:
- LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN
- INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN
- LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0
- INT_MIN%-1 = 0
where -1 can be an immediate or in a register.
Insn patching is needed to handle the above cases and the patched codes
produced results aligned with above arm64 result. The below are pseudo
codes to handle sdiv/smod exceptions including both divisor -1 and divisor 0
and the divisor is stored in a register.
sdiv:
tmp = rX
tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L2
if tmp == 0 goto L1
rY = 0
L1:
rY = -rY;
goto L3
L2:
rY /= rX
L3:
smod:
tmp = rX
tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -> [0, 1]
if tmp >(unsigned) 1 goto L1
if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3)
rY = 0;
goto L2
L1:
rY %= rX
L2:
goto L4 // only when !is64
L3:
wY = wY // only when !is64
L4:
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "45f2bbe7bc08d716a07a40025c672cad93180903",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec0e2da95f72d4a46050a4d994e4fe471474fd80",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4902a6a0dc593c82055fc8c9ada371bafe26c9cc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec0e2da95f72d4a46050a4d994e4fe471474fd80",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d22e45a369afc7c28f11acfa5b5e8e478227ca5d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec0e2da95f72d4a46050a4d994e4fe471474fd80",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7dd34d7b7dcf9309fc6224caf4dd5b35bedddcb7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec0e2da95f72d4a46050a4d994e4fe471474fd80",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.10.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.11.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.11.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "652638C5-5F25-4DF3-AD42-DD3252A97152",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.10.14",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "54D9C704-D679-41A7-9C40-10A6B1E7FFE9",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.11.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix a sdiv overflow issue\n\nZac Ecob reported a problem where a bpf program may cause kernel crash due\nto the following error:\n Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\n\nThe failure is due to the below signed divide:\n LLONG_MIN/-1 where LLONG_MIN equals to -9,223,372,036,854,775,808.\nLLONG_MIN/-1 is supposed to give a positive number 9,223,372,036,854,775,808,\nbut it is impossible since for 64-bit system, the maximum positive\nnumber is 9,223,372,036,854,775,807. On x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 will\ncause a kernel exception. On arm64, the result for LLONG_MIN/-1 is\nLLONG_MIN.\n\nFurther investigation found all the following sdiv/smod cases may trigger\nan exception when bpf program is running on x86_64 platform:\n - LLONG_MIN/-1 for 64bit operation\n - INT_MIN/-1 for 32bit operation\n - LLONG_MIN%-1 for 64bit operation\n - INT_MIN%-1 for 32bit operation\nwhere -1 can be an immediate or in a register.\n\nOn arm64, there are no exceptions:\n - LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN\n - INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN\n - LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0\n - INT_MIN%-1 = 0\nwhere -1 can be an immediate or in a register.\n\nInsn patching is needed to handle the above cases and the patched codes\nproduced results aligned with above arm64 result. The below are pseudo\ncodes to handle sdiv/smod exceptions including both divisor -1 and divisor 0\nand the divisor is stored in a register.\n\nsdiv:\n tmp = rX\n tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -\u003e [0, 1]\n if tmp \u003e(unsigned) 1 goto L2\n if tmp == 0 goto L1\n rY = 0\n L1:\n rY = -rY;\n goto L3\n L2:\n rY /= rX\n L3:\n\nsmod:\n tmp = rX\n tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -\u003e [0, 1]\n if tmp \u003e(unsigned) 1 goto L1\n if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3)\n rY = 0;\n goto L2\n L1:\n rY %= rX\n L2:\n goto L4 // only when !is64\n L3:\n wY = wY // only when !is64\n L4:\n\n [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: soluciona un problema de desbordamiento de sdiv Zac Ecob inform\u00f3 de un problema en el que un programa bpf puede provocar un fallo del kernel debido al siguiente error: Oops: error de divisi\u00f3n: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI El fallo se debe a la siguiente divisi\u00f3n con signo: LLONG_MIN/-1 donde LLONG_MIN equivale a -9.223.372.036.854.775.808. Se supone que LLONG_MIN/-1 da un n\u00famero positivo 9.223.372.036.854.775.808, pero es imposible ya que para sistemas de 64 bits, el n\u00famero positivo m\u00e1ximo es 9.223.372.036.854.775.807. En x86_64, LLONG_MIN/-1 provocar\u00e1 una excepci\u00f3n del kernel. En arm64, el resultado para LLONG_MIN/-1 es LLONG_MIN. Una investigaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s profunda encontr\u00f3 que todos los siguientes casos de sdiv/smod pueden activar una excepci\u00f3n cuando el programa bpf se ejecuta en la plataforma x86_64: - LLONG_MIN/-1 para operaci\u00f3n de 64 bits - INT_MIN/-1 para operaci\u00f3n de 32 bits - LLONG_MIN%-1 para operaci\u00f3n de 64 bits - INT_MIN%-1 para operaci\u00f3n de 32 bits donde -1 puede ser inmediato o en un registro. En arm64, no hay excepciones: - LLONG_MIN/-1 = LLONG_MIN - INT_MIN/-1 = INT_MIN - LLONG_MIN%-1 = 0 - INT_MIN%-1 = 0 donde -1 puede ser inmediato o en un registro. Se necesita aplicar un parche a Insn para manejar los casos anteriores y los c\u00f3digos parcheados produjeron resultados alineados con el resultado de arm64 anterior. Los siguientes son pseudoc\u00f3digos para manejar excepciones sdiv/smod incluyendo tanto el divisor -1 como el divisor 0 y el divisor se almacena en un registro. sdiv: tmp = rX tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -\u0026gt; [0, 1] if tmp \u0026gt;(unsigned) 1 goto L2 if tmp == 0 goto L1 rY = 0 L1: rY = -rY; goto L3 L2: rY /= rX L3: smod: tmp = rX tmp += 1 /* [-1, 0] -\u0026gt; [0, 1] if tmp \u0026gt;(unsigned) 1 goto L1 if tmp == 1 (is64 ? goto L2 : goto L3) rY = 0; goto L2 L1: rY %= rX L2: goto L4 // solo cuando !is64 L3: wY = wY // solo cuando !is64 L4: [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/tPJLTEh7S_DxFEqAI2Ji5MBSoZVg7_G-Py2iaZpAaWtM961fFTWtsnlzwvTbzBzaUzwQAoNATXKUlt0LZOFgnDcIyKCswAnAGdUF3LBrhGQ=@protonmail.com/"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-49888",
"lastModified": "2026-10-21T13:17:48.833",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-49888",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-10-22T13:44:44.632925Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-10-21T18:15:11.443",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45f2bbe7bc08d716a07a40025c672cad93180903"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4902a6a0dc593c82055fc8c9ada371bafe26c9cc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd34d7b7dcf9309fc6224caf4dd5b35bedddcb7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d22e45a369afc7c28f11acfa5b5e8e478227ca5d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-190"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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