FKIE_CVE-2024-48930

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-10-21 16:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:59
Summary
secp256k1-node is a Node.js binding for an Optimized C library for EC operations on curve secp256k1. In `elliptic`-based version, `loadUncompressedPublicKey` has a check that the public key is on the curve. Prior to versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1, however, `loadCompressedPublicKey` is missing that check. That allows the attacker to use public keys on low-cardinality curves to extract enough information to fully restore the private key from as little as 11 ECDH sessions, and very cheaply on compute power. Other operations on public keys are also affected, including e.g. `publicKeyVerify()` incorrectly returning `true` on those invalid keys, and e.g. `publicKeyTweakMul()` also returning predictable outcomes allowing to restore the tweak. Versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1 contain a fix for the issue.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "secp256k1-node",
          "vendor": "cryptocoinjs",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "= 5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.0.4"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.8.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    },
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:secp256k1-node_project:secp256k1-node:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "secp256k1-node",
          "vendor": "secp256k1-node_project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.0.4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.0.0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.8.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "secp256k1-node is a Node.js binding for an Optimized C library for EC operations on curve secp256k1. In `elliptic`-based version, `loadUncompressedPublicKey` has a check that the public key is on the curve. Prior to versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1, however, `loadCompressedPublicKey` is missing that check. That allows the attacker to use public keys on low-cardinality curves to extract enough information to fully restore the private key from as little as 11 ECDH sessions, and very cheaply on compute power. Other operations on public keys are also affected, including e.g. `publicKeyVerify()` incorrectly returning `true` on those invalid keys, and e.g. `publicKeyTweakMul()` also returning predictable outcomes allowing to restore the tweak. Versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1 contain a fix for the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "secp256k1-node es un enlace de Node.js para una librer\u00eda C optimizada para operaciones EC en la curva secp256k1. En la versi\u00f3n basada en `elliptic`, `loadUncompressedPublicKey` tiene una comprobaci\u00f3n de que la clave p\u00fablica est\u00e1 en la curva. Sin embargo, antes de las versiones 5.0.1, 4.0.4 y 3.8.1, `loadCompressedPublicKey` no tiene esa comprobaci\u00f3n. Eso permite al atacante usar claves p\u00fablicas en curvas de baja cardinalidad para extraer suficiente informaci\u00f3n para restaurar completamente la clave privada a partir de tan solo 11 sesiones ECDH, y de manera muy econ\u00f3mica en cuanto a potencia de c\u00f3mputo. Otras operaciones en claves p\u00fablicas tambi\u00e9n se ven afectadas, incluyendo, por ejemplo, `publicKeyVerify()` que devuelve incorrectamente `true` en esas claves no v\u00e1lidas, y, por ejemplo, `publicKeyTweakMul()` que tambi\u00e9n devuelve resultados predecibles que permiten restaurar el ajuste. Las versiones 5.0.1, 4.0.4 y 3.8.1 contienen una soluci\u00f3n para el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-48930",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:59:04.443",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-48930",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-10-21T16:36:50.720373Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-10-21T16:15:03.607",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/blob/6d3474b81d073cc9c8cc8cfadb580c84f8df5248/lib/elliptic.js#L17-L19"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/blob/6d3474b81d073cc9c8cc8cfadb580c84f8df5248/lib/elliptic.js#L37-L39"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/commit/8bd6446e000fa59df3cda0ae3e424300747ea5ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/commit/9a15fff274f83a6ec7f675f1121babcc0c42292f"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/commit/e256905ee649a7caacc251f7c964667195a52221"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/security/advisories/GHSA-584q-6j8j-r5pm"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-354"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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