FKIE_CVE-2024-46834

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-09-27 13:15 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:17
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: fail closed if we can't get max channel used in indirection tables Commit 0d1b7d6c9274 ("bnxt: fix crashes when reducing ring count with active RSS contexts") proves that allowing indirection table to contain channels with out of bounds IDs may lead to crashes. Currently the max channel check in the core gets skipped if driver can't fetch the indirection table or when we can't allocate memory. Both of those conditions should be extremely rare but if they do happen we should try to be safe and fail the channel change.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ethtool/channels.c",
            "net/ethtool/common.c",
            "net/ethtool/common.h",
            "net/ethtool/ioctl.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "83203ec6f65680109b2048c4f3e501efc14104ba",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d4ab4286276fcd6c155bafdf4422b712068d2516",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7e6ff8c58985fbe20d131112aba0a8867cdedc59",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d4ab4286276fcd6c155bafdf4422b712068d2516",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "101737d8b88dbd4be6010bac398fe810f1950036",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d4ab4286276fcd6c155bafdf4422b712068d2516",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2899d58462ba868287d6ff3acad3675e7adf934f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d4ab4286276fcd6c155bafdf4422b712068d2516",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ethtool/channels.c",
            "net/ethtool/common.c",
            "net/ethtool/common.h",
            "net/ethtool/ioctl.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.6"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.6",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.191",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.10.10",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.11",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "75C6119D-9E8D-431D-813F-FE84579072CB",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.10.10",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nethtool: fail closed if we can\u0027t get max channel used in indirection tables\n\nCommit 0d1b7d6c9274 (\"bnxt: fix crashes when reducing ring count with\nactive RSS contexts\") proves that allowing indirection table to contain\nchannels with out of bounds IDs may lead to crashes. Currently the\nmax channel check in the core gets skipped if driver can\u0027t fetch\nthe indirection table or when we can\u0027t allocate memory.\n\nBoth of those conditions should be extremely rare but if they do\nhappen we should try to be safe and fail the channel change."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ethtool: error cerrado si no podemos obtener el canal m\u00e1ximo usado en las tablas de indirecci\u00f3n. El commit 0d1b7d6c9274 (\"bnxt: corregir fallos al reducir el recuento de anillos con contextos RSS activos\") demuestra que permitir que la tabla de indirecci\u00f3n contenga canales con identificadores fuera de los l\u00edmites puede provocar fallos. Actualmente, la comprobaci\u00f3n del canal m\u00e1ximo en el n\u00facleo se omite si el controlador no puede obtener la tabla de indirecci\u00f3n o cuando no podemos asignar memoria. Ambas condiciones deber\u00edan ser extremadamente raras, pero si ocurren, debemos intentar ser seguros y fallar el cambio de canal."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-46834",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:17:36.603",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 5.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-46834",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-09-29T14:03:28.433366Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-09-27T13:15:15.660",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/101737d8b88dbd4be6010bac398fe810f1950036"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2899d58462ba868287d6ff3acad3675e7adf934f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e6ff8c58985fbe20d131112aba0a8867cdedc59"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83203ec6f65680109b2048c4f3e501efc14104ba"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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