FKIE_CVE-2024-43378
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-08-16 02:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:50
Severity
Summary
calamares-nixos-extensions provides Calamares branding and modules for NixOS, a distribution of GNU/Linux. Users who installed NixOS through the graphical installer who used manual disk partitioning to create a setup where the system was booted via legacy BIOS rather than UEFI; some disk partitions are encrypted; but the partitions containing either `/` or `/boot` are unencrypted; have their LUKS disk encryption key file in plain text either in `/crypto_keyfile.bin`, or in a CPIO archive attached to their NixOS initrd. `nixos-install` is not affected, nor are UEFI installations, nor was the default automatic partitioning configuration on legacy BIOS systems. The problem has been fixed in calamares-nixos-extensions 0.3.17, which was included in NixOS. The current installer images for the NixOS 24.05 and unstable (24.11) channels are unaffected. The fix reached 24.05 at 2024-08-13 20:06:59 UTC, and unstable at 2024-08-15 09:00:20 UTC. Installer images downloaded before those times may be vulnerable. The best solution for affected users is probably to back up their data and do a complete reinstallation. However, the mitigation procedure in GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww should work solely for the case where `/` is encrypted but `/boot` is not. If `/` is unencrypted, then the `/crypto_keyfile.bin` file will need to be deleted in addition to the remediation steps in the previous advisory. This issue is a partial regression of CVE-2023-36476 / GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww, which was more severe as it applied to the default configuration on BIOS systems.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "calamares-nixos-extensions",
"vendor": "NixOS",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.3.17"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:nixos:calamares-nixos-extensions:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "calamares-nixos-extensions",
"vendor": "nixos",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.3.17",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "calamares-nixos-extensions provides Calamares branding and modules for NixOS, a distribution of GNU/Linux. Users who installed NixOS through the graphical installer who used manual disk partitioning to create a setup where the system was booted via legacy BIOS rather than UEFI; some disk partitions are encrypted; but the partitions containing either `/` or `/boot` are unencrypted; have their LUKS disk encryption key file in plain text either in `/crypto_keyfile.bin`, or in a CPIO archive attached to their NixOS initrd. `nixos-install` is not affected, nor are UEFI installations, nor was the default automatic partitioning configuration on legacy BIOS systems. The problem has been fixed in calamares-nixos-extensions 0.3.17, which was included in NixOS. The current installer images for the NixOS 24.05 and unstable (24.11) channels are unaffected. The fix reached 24.05 at 2024-08-13 20:06:59 UTC, and unstable at 2024-08-15 09:00:20 UTC. Installer images downloaded before those times may be vulnerable. The best solution for affected users is probably to back up their data and do a complete reinstallation. However, the mitigation procedure in GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww should work solely for the case where `/` is encrypted but `/boot` is not. If `/` is unencrypted, then the `/crypto_keyfile.bin` file will need to be deleted in addition to the remediation steps in the previous advisory. This issue is a partial regression of CVE-2023-36476 / GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww, which was more severe as it applied to the default configuration on BIOS systems."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "calamares-nixos-extensions proporciona la marca Calamares y m\u00f3dulos para NixOS, una distribuci\u00f3n de GNU/Linux. Usuarios que instalaron NixOS a trav\u00e9s del instalador gr\u00e1fico que utilizaron la partici\u00f3n manual del disco para crear una configuraci\u00f3n en la que el sistema se inici\u00f3 a trav\u00e9s de BIOS heredado en lugar de UEFI; algunas particiones del disco est\u00e1n cifradas; pero las particiones que contienen `/` o `/boot` no est\u00e1n cifradas; tener su archivo de clave de cifrado de disco LUKS en texto plano, ya sea en `/crypto_keyfile.bin` o en un archivo CPIO adjunto a su initrd de NixOS. `nixos-install` no se ve afectado, ni tampoco las instalaciones UEFI, ni la configuraci\u00f3n de partici\u00f3n autom\u00e1tica predeterminada en los sistemas BIOS heredados. El problema se solucion\u00f3 en calamares-nixos-extensions 0.3.17, que se incluy\u00f3 en NixOS. Las im\u00e1genes del instalador actual para los canales NixOS 24.05 e inestable (24.11) no se ven afectadas. La correcci\u00f3n lleg\u00f3 a las 24.05 el 13 de agosto de 2024 a las 20:06:59 UTC y fue inestable el 15 de agosto de 2024 a las 09:00:20 UTC. Las im\u00e1genes del instalador descargadas antes de esas fechas pueden ser vulnerables. La mejor soluci\u00f3n para los usuarios afectados probablemente sea hacer una copia de seguridad de sus datos y realizar una reinstalaci\u00f3n completa. Sin embargo, el procedimiento de mitigaci\u00f3n en GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww deber\u00eda funcionar \u00fanicamente en el caso en el que `/` est\u00e9 cifrado pero `/boot` no. Si `/` no est\u00e1 cifrado, entonces ser\u00e1 necesario eliminar el archivo `/crypto_keyfile.bin` adem\u00e1s de seguir los pasos de correcci\u00f3n del aviso anterior. Este problema es una regresi\u00f3n parcial de CVE-2023-36476/GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww, que era m\u00e1s grave al aplicarse a la configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada en los sistemas BIOS."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-43378",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:50:54.870",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.4,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-43378",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-08-19T20:54:33.909326Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-08-16T02:15:17.877",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/NixOS/calamares-nixos-extensions/pull/43"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/NixOS/calamares-nixos-extensions/security/advisories/GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/NixOS/calamares-nixos-extensions/security/advisories/GHSA-vfxf-gpmj-2p25"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/331607"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/334252"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-256"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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