FKIE_CVE-2024-34708
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-05-14 15:39 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:334.9 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "directus",
"vendor": "directus",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 10.11.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:monospace:directus:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EE19D15A-1ADB-4207-8730-3EC25C39DE58",
"versionEndExcluding": "10.11.0",
"vulnerable": true
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the `alias` functionality on the API. Normally, these redacted fields will return `**********` however if we change the request to `?alias[workaround]=redacted` we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field. This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Directus es una API y un panel de aplicaciones en tiempo real para administrar el contenido de la base de datos SQL. Un usuario con permiso para ver cualquier colecci\u00f3n utilizando campos hash redactados puede acceder a la versi\u00f3n almacenada sin formato utilizando la funcionalidad \"alias\" en la API. Normalmente, estos campos redactados devolver\u00e1n `**********`; sin embargo, si cambiamos la solicitud a `?alias[workaround]=redacted`, podemos recuperar el valor de texto sin formato para el campo. Esto se puede evitar eliminando el permiso para ver los campos confidenciales por completo a los usuarios o roles que no deber\u00edan poder verlos. Esta vulnerabilidad se solucion\u00f3 en 10.11.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-34708",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:33:54.987",
"metrics": {
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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"version": "3.1"
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"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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"ssvcV203": [
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"options": [
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{
"automatable": "no"
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{
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],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-05-15T15:21:26.312353Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"published": "2024-05-14T15:39:31.083",
"references": [
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"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/e70a90c267bea695afce6545174c2b77517d617b"
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"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"description": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
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],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.