FKIE_CVE-2024-34704
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-05-14 15:39 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:33
Severity
Summary
era-compiler-solidity is the ZKsync compiler for Solidity. The problem occurred during instruction selection in the `DAGCombine` phase while visiting the XOR operation. The issue arises when attempting to fold the expression `!(x cc y)` into `(x !cc y)`. To perform this transformation, the second operand of XOR should be a constant representing the true value. However, it was incorrectly assumed that -1 represents the true value, when in fact, 1 is the correct representation, so this transformation for this case should be skipped. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "era-compiler-solidity",
"vendor": "matter-labs",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 1.2.0, \u003c= 1.4.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:matter-labs:era-compiler-solidity:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "era-compiler-solidity",
"vendor": "matter-labs",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.4.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.2.0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "era-compiler-solidity is the ZKsync compiler for Solidity. The problem occurred during instruction selection in the `DAGCombine` phase while visiting the XOR operation. The issue arises when attempting to fold the expression `!(x cc y)` into `(x !cc y)`. To perform this transformation, the second operand of XOR should be a constant representing the true value. However, it was incorrectly assumed that -1 represents the true value, when in fact, 1 is the correct representation, so this transformation for this case should be skipped. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "era-compiler-solidity es el compilador ZKsync para Solidity. El problema ocurri\u00f3 durante la selecci\u00f3n de instrucciones en la fase \"DAGCombine\" mientras se visitaba la operaci\u00f3n XOR. El problema surge al intentar doblar la expresi\u00f3n `!(x cc y)` en `(x !cc y)`. Para realizar esta transformaci\u00f3n, el segundo operando de XOR debe ser una constante que represente el valor verdadero. Sin embargo, se asumi\u00f3 incorrectamente que -1 representa el valor verdadero, cuando en realidad 1 es la representaci\u00f3n correcta, por lo que se debe omitir esta transformaci\u00f3n en este caso. Esta vulnerabilidad se solucion\u00f3 en 1.4.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-34704",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:33:54.620",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-34704",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-05-14T01:22:19.210870Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-05-14T15:39:29.560",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/matter-labs/era-compiler-solidity/security/advisories/GHSA-22pj-7cvw-r3gc"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "https://github.com/matter-labs/era-compiler-solidity/security/advisories/GHSA-22pj-7cvw-r3gc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-682"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.