FKIE_CVE-2024-32649
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-04-25 18:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:305.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "vyper",
"vendor": "vyperlang",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c= 0.3.10"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:vyperlang:vyper:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "vyper",
"vendor": "vyperlang",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "*"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:vyperlang:vyper:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CEC5BCE2-DB5C-49EB-A302-F11E4E02F9BD",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.4.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Vyper is a pythonic Smart Contract Language for the Ethereum virtual machine. In versions 0.3.10 and prior, using the `sqrt` builtin can result in double eval vulnerability when the argument has side-effects. It can be seen that the `build_IR` function of the `sqrt` builtin doesn\u0027t cache the argument to the stack. As such, it can be evaluated multiple times (instead of retrieving the value from the stack). No vulnerable production contracts were found. Additionally, double evaluation of side-effects should be easily discoverable in client tests. As such, the impact is low. As of time of publication, no fixed versions are available.\n"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Vyper es un lenguaje de contrato inteligente pit\u00f3nico para la m\u00e1quina virtual Ethereum. En las versiones 0.3.10 y anteriores, el uso de la funci\u00f3n incorporada `sqrt` puede generar una vulnerabilidad de doble evaluaci\u00f3n cuando el argumento tiene efectos secundarios. Se puede ver que la funci\u00f3n `build_IR` del incorporado `sqrt` no almacena en cach\u00e9 el argumento en la pila. Como tal, se puede evaluar varias veces (en lugar de recuperar el valor de la pila). No se encontraron contratos de producci\u00f3n vulnerables. Adem\u00e1s, la doble evaluaci\u00f3n de los efectos secundarios deber\u00eda poder descubrirse f\u00e1cilmente en las pruebas de los clientes. Como tal, el impacto es bajo. Al momento de la publicaci\u00f3n, no hay versiones fijas disponibles."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-32649",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:30:01.800",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-32649",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-04-29T12:16:42.844342Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-04-25T18:15:09.350",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-5jrj-52x8-m64h"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-5jrj-52x8-m64h"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-95"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-Other"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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