FKIE_CVE-2024-32000

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-04-12 20:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:29
Summary
matrix-appservice-irc is a Node.js IRC bridge for the Matrix messaging protocol. matrix-appservice-irc before version 2.0.0 can be exploited to leak the truncated body of a message if a malicious user sends a Matrix reply to an event ID they don't have access to. As a precondition to the attack, the malicious user needs to know the event ID of the message they want to leak, as well as to be joined to both the Matrix room and the IRC channel it is bridged to. The message reply containing the leaked message content is visible to IRC channel members when this happens. matrix-appservice-irc 2.0.0 checks whether the user has permission to view an event before constructing a reply. Administrators should upgrade to this version. It's possible to limit the amount of information leaked by setting a reply template that doesn't contain the original message. See these lines `601-604` in the configuration file linked.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "matrix-appservice-irc",
          "vendor": "matrix-org",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.0.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "matrix-appservice-irc is a Node.js IRC bridge for the Matrix messaging protocol. matrix-appservice-irc before version 2.0.0 can be exploited to leak the truncated body of a message if a malicious user sends a Matrix reply to an event ID they don\u0027t have access to. As a precondition to the attack, the malicious user needs to know the event ID of the message they want to leak, as well as to be joined to both the Matrix room and the IRC channel it is bridged to. The message reply containing the leaked message content is visible to IRC channel members when this happens. matrix-appservice-irc 2.0.0 checks whether the user has permission to view an event before constructing a reply. Administrators should upgrade to this version. It\u0027s possible to limit the amount of information leaked by setting a reply template that doesn\u0027t contain the original message. See these lines `601-604` in the configuration file linked."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Matrix-appservice-irc es un puente IRC de Node.js para el protocolo de mensajer\u00eda Matrix. Matrix-appservice-irc anterior a la versi\u00f3n 2.0.0 puede explotarse para filtrar el cuerpo truncado de un mensaje si un usuario malintencionado env\u00eda una respuesta de Matrix a un ID de evento al que no tiene acceso. Como condici\u00f3n previa al ataque, el usuario malintencionado necesita conocer el ID del evento del mensaje que desea filtrar, as\u00ed como estar unido tanto a la sala Matrix como al canal IRC al que est\u00e1 conectado. La respuesta al mensaje que contiene el contenido del mensaje filtrado es visible para los miembros del canal IRC cuando esto sucede. Matrix-appservice-irc 2.0.0 comprueba si el usuario tiene permiso para ver un evento antes de construir una respuesta. Los administradores deben actualizar a esta versi\u00f3n. Es posible limitar la cantidad de informaci\u00f3n filtrada configurando una plantilla de respuesta que no contenga el mensaje original. Consulte estas l\u00edneas `601-604` en el archivo de configuraci\u00f3n vinculado."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-32000",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:29:05.903",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-32000",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-07-10T20:18:35.743707Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-04-12T20:15:53.250",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/blob/d5d67d1d3ea3f0f6962a0af2cc57b56af3ad2129/config.sample.yaml#L601-L604"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/pull/1799"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/security/advisories/GHSA-wm4w-7h2q-3pf7"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/blob/d5d67d1d3ea3f0f6962a0af2cc57b56af3ad2129/config.sample.yaml#L601-L604"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/pull/1799"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/security/advisories/GHSA-wm4w-7h2q-3pf7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-280"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-755"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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