FKIE_CVE-2024-1524

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-24 09:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:04
Severity
7.7 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
8.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
When the "Silent Just-In-Time Provisioning" feature is enabled for a federated identity provider (IDP) there is a risk that a local user store user's information may be replaced during the account provisioning process in cases where federated users share the same username as local users. There will be no impact on your deployment if any of the preconditions mentioned below are not met. Only when all the preconditions mentioned below are fulfilled could a malicious actor associate a targeted local user account with a federated IDP user account that they control. The Deployment should have: -An IDP configured for federated authentication with Silent JIT provisioning enabled. The malicious actor should have: -A fresh valid user account in the federated IDP that has not been used earlier. -Knowledge of the username of a valid user in the local IDP. -An account at the federated IDP matching the targeted local username.
References
ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8https://security.docs.wso2.com/en/latest/security-announcements/security-advisories/2026/WSO2-2024-3144/Broken Link
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
wso2 api_manager *
wso2 identity_server *
wso2 identity_server *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "WSO2 API Manager",
          "vendor": "WSO2",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.2.0.108",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.2.0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "WSO2 Identity Server",
          "vendor": "WSO2",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "6.0.0.171",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.0.0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.1.0.128",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.1.0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wso2:api_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "34356A76-A7CF-4B29-B868-F30394F9F389",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.2.0.108",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.2.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wso2:identity_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7DDF5D0E-D8BB-4BFE-9506-4D683AE1E0F5",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.0.0.171",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.0.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wso2:identity_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BF5E20C2-3317-4671-B66D-7437656A2AD6",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.1.0.128",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.1.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "When the \"Silent Just-In-Time Provisioning\" feature is enabled for a federated identity provider (IDP)  there is a risk that a local user store user\u0027s information may be replaced during the account provisioning process in cases where federated users share the same username as local users. \n\n There will be no impact on your deployment if any of the preconditions mentioned below are not met. Only when all the preconditions mentioned below are fulfilled could a malicious actor associate a targeted local user account with a federated IDP user account that they control.\n\nThe Deployment should have: \n-An IDP configured for federated authentication with Silent JIT provisioning enabled.\n\nThe malicious actor should have:\n-A fresh valid user account in the federated IDP that has not been used earlier.\n-Knowledge of the username of a valid user in the local IDP. \n-An account at the federated IDP matching the targeted local username."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Cuando la caracter\u00edstica \u0027Aprovisionamiento Silencioso Justo a Tiempo\u0027 est\u00e1 habilitada para un proveedor de identidad federado (IDP), existe un riesgo de que la informaci\u00f3n de un usuario del almac\u00e9n de usuarios local pueda ser reemplazada durante el proceso de aprovisionamiento de cuentas en casos donde los usuarios federados comparten el mismo nombre de usuario que los usuarios locales.\n\nNo habr\u00e1 impacto en su despliegue si alguna de las precondiciones mencionadas a continuaci\u00f3n no se cumple. Solo cuando todas las precondiciones mencionadas a continuaci\u00f3n se cumplan, podr\u00eda un actor malicioso asociar una cuenta de usuario local objetivo con una cuenta de usuario de IDP federado que ellos controlan.\n\nEl despliegue deber\u00eda tener:\n-Un IDP configurado para autenticaci\u00f3n federada con aprovisionamiento JIT silencioso habilitado.\n\nEl actor malicioso deber\u00eda tener:\n-Una cuenta de usuario v\u00e1lida y nueva en el IDP federado que no haya sido utilizada anteriormente.\n-Conocimiento del nombre de usuario de un usuario v\u00e1lido en el IDP local.\n-Una cuenta en el IDP federado que coincida con el nombre de usuario local objetivo."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-1524",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:04:25.390",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 7.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.5,
        "source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-1524",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-02-24T14:28:36.905503Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-02-24T09:16:11.700",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
      "tags": [
        "Broken Link"
      ],
      "url": "https://security.docs.wso2.com/en/latest/security-announcements/security-advisories/2026/WSO2-2024-3144/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-290"
        }
      ],
      "source": "ed10eef1-636d-4fbe-9993-6890dfa878f8",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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