FKIE_CVE-2024-1410
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-03-12 18:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:045.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| cloudflare | quiche | * | |
| cloudflare | quiche | 0.20.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "quiche",
"platforms": [
"Rust"
],
"product": "quiche",
"vendor": "Cloudflare",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "\u003c0.19.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.15.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "\u003c0.20.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.20.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:quiche:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "766A657F-7E28-4614-8BC7-8C4174113D5C",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.19.2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:quiche:0.20.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "FDEEF485-B228-4822-8462-6FE1C0C0B47F",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement, which could lead to excessive resource consumption. Each QUIC connection possesses a set of connection Identifiers (IDs); see RFC 9000 Section 5.1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Endpoints declare the number of active connection IDs they are willing to support using the active_connection_id_limit transport parameter. The peer can create new IDs using a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame but must stay within the active ID limit. This is done by retirement of old IDs, the endpoint sends NEW_CONNECTION_ID includes a value in the retire_prior_to field, which elicits a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame as confirmation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames and manipulating the connection (e.g. by restricting the peer\u0027s congestion window size) so that RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames can only be sent at a slower rate than they are received, leading to storage of information related to connection IDs in an unbounded queue. Quiche versions 0.19.2 and 0.20.1 are the earliest to address this problem. There is no workaround for affected versions.\n"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Se descubri\u00f3 que Cloudflare quiche era vulnerable al almacenamiento ilimitado de informaci\u00f3n relacionada con la retirada del ID de conexi\u00f3n, lo que podr\u00eda provocar un consumo excesivo de recursos. Cada conexi\u00f3n QUIC posee un conjunto de Identificadores de conexi\u00f3n (ID); consulte RFC 9000 Secci\u00f3n 5.1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1. Los endpoints declaran la cantidad de ID de conexi\u00f3n activa que est\u00e1n dispuestos a admitir mediante el par\u00e1metro de transporte active_connection_id_limit. El par puede crear nuevas ID utilizando un framework NEW_CONNECTION_ID pero debe permanecer dentro del l\u00edmite de ID activo. Esto se hace retirando los ID antiguos, el endpoint env\u00eda NEW_CONNECTION_ID e incluye un valor en el campo retire_prior_to, que genera un framework RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID como confirmaci\u00f3n. Un atacante remoto no autenticado puede explotar la vulnerabilidad enviando tramas NEW_CONNECTION_ID y manipulando la conexi\u00f3n (por ejemplo, restringiendo el tama\u00f1o de la ventana de congesti\u00f3n del par) de modo que las tramas RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID solo puedan enviarse a una velocidad m\u00e1s lenta de la que se reciben, lo que lleva al almacenamiento de informaci\u00f3n relacionada con ID de conexi\u00f3n en una cola ilimitada. Las versiones 0.19.2 y 0.20.1 de Quiche son las primeras en solucionar este problema. No existe ning\u00fan workaround para las versiones afectadas."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-1410",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:04:10.920",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 3.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-1410",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-03-13T14:23:25.900496Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-03-12T18:15:07.493",
"references": [
{
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-xhg9-xwch-vr7x"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-xhg9-xwch-vr7x"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
}
],
"source": "cna@cloudflare.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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