FKIE_CVE-2024-10668
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-11-07 16:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:56
Severity
Summary
There exists an auth bypass in Google Quickshare where an attacker can upload an unknown file type to a victim. The root cause of the vulnerability lies in the fact that when a Payload Transfer frame of type FILE is sent to Quick Share, the file that is contained in this frame is written to disk in the Downloads folder. Quickshare normally deletes unkown files, however an attacker can send two Payload transfer frames of type FILE and the same payload ID. The deletion logic will only delete the first file and not the second. We recommend upgrading past commit 5d8b9156e0c339d82d3dab0849187e8819ad92c0 or Quick Share Windows v1.0.2002.2
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cve-coordination@google.com | https://github.com/google/nearby/pull/2892 | Issue Tracking, Patch |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| quick_share | * | ||
| microsoft | windows | - |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/google/nearby",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "Nearby",
"product": "Nearby",
"repo": "https://github.com/google/nearby",
"vendor": "Google",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5d8b9156e0c339d82d3dab0849187e8819ad92c0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.0.2002.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve-coordination@google.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:google:quick_share:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "8012A6BF-79EB-478C-AAA2-3F356DB2E9BD",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.0.2002.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
},
{
"cpeMatch": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A2572D17-1DE6-457B-99CC-64AFD54487EA",
"vulnerable": false
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "There exists an auth bypass in Google Quickshare where an attacker can upload an unknown file type to a victim.\u00a0The root cause of the vulnerability lies in the fact that when a Payload Transfer frame of type FILE is sent to Quick Share, the file that is contained in this frame is written to disk in the Downloads folder. Quickshare normally deletes unkown files, however an attacker can send two Payload transfer frames of type FILE and the same payload ID. The deletion logic will only delete the first file and not the second. We recommend upgrading past commit\u00a05d8b9156e0c339d82d3dab0849187e8819ad92c0 or\u00a0Quick Share Windows v1.0.2002.2"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Existe una omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n en Google Quickshare mediante la cual un atacante puede cargar un tipo de archivo desconocido a una v\u00edctima. La causa principal de la vulnerabilidad radica en el hecho de que cuando se env\u00eda un frame de transferencia de payload de tipo FILE a Quick Share, el archivo que est\u00e1 contenido en este frame se escribe en el disco en la carpeta Descargas. Quickshare normalmente elimina archivos desconocidos, sin embargo, un atacante puede enviar dos frames de transferencia de payload de tipo FILE y el mismo ID de payload. La l\u00f3gica de eliminaci\u00f3n solo eliminar\u00e1 el primer archivo y no el segundo. Recomendamos actualizar la versi\u00f3n anterior a el commit 5d8b9156e0c339d82d3dab0849187e8819ad92c0 o Quick Share Windows v1.0.2002.2"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-10668",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:56:09.660",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
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"Recovery": "USER",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "GREEN",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "DIFFUSE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:L/U:Green",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "LOW"
},
"source": "cve-coordination@google.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-10668",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-11-07T16:09:55.288390Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-11-07T16:15:16.923",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve-coordination@google.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/google/nearby/pull/2892"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve-coordination@google.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-434"
}
],
"source": "cve-coordination@google.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.