FKIE_CVE-2023-54224
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-30 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-28 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "779c3cf2749c7a7bad6f839cb2954a25ba92f4d6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "506650dcb3a716ad98681f7091ba2f8e748c04b8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "32247b9526bfdaeef85f7339d9b4f913c7370f92",
"status": "affected",
"version": "506650dcb3a716ad98681f7091ba2f8e748c04b8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "36d918da3f1bf749178c7daf471a3be1730ed3ca",
"status": "affected",
"version": "506650dcb3a716ad98681f7091ba2f8e748c04b8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e110f8911ddb93e6f55da14ccbbe705397b30d0b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "506650dcb3a716ad98681f7091ba2f8e748c04b8",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.133",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.5.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running delayed items\n\nWhen running delayed items we are holding a delayed node\u0027s mutex and then\nwe will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the\ndelayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example,\nbtrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent\nbuffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the\ndelayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the\ndelayed node\u0027s mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported\nby syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following:\n\n WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected\n 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted\n ------------------------------------------------------\n syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock:\n ffff88801835c0c0 (\u0026delayed_node-\u003emutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256\n\n but task is already holding lock:\n ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198\n\n which lock already depends on the new lock.\n\n the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:\n\n -\u003e #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:\n __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline]\n lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781\n up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625\n btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]\n btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239\n search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline]\n btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230\n btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376\n btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline]\n btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]\n __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111\n __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153\n flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723\n btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078\n process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600\n worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751\n kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389\n ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\n -\u003e #0 (\u0026delayed_node-\u003emutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:\n check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]\n check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]\n validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]\n __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144\n lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761\n __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603\n __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]\n mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799\n __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256\n btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]\n __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156\n btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276\n btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988\n vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]\n vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]\n do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]\n __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]\n __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]\n __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n\n other info that\n---truncated---"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nbtrfs: corrige el mensaje de advertencia de lockdep y el interbloqueo potencial despu\u00e9s de un fallo al ejecutar elementos retrasados\n\nAl ejecutar elementos retrasados, estamos manteniendo el mutex de un nodo retrasado y luego intentaremos modificar un btree de subvolumen para insertar/actualizar/eliminar los elementos retrasados. Sin embargo, si hay un error durante las inserciones, por ejemplo, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() puede retornar con una ruta que tiene b\u00faferes de extensi\u00f3n bloqueados (al menos una hoja), y luego intentamos liberar el nodo retrasado en __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), lo que requiere tomar el mutex del nodo retrasado, causando un interbloqueo de tipo ABBA. Esto fue reportado por syzbot y el mensaje de advertencia de lockdep es el siguiente:\n\n ADVERTENCIA: posible dependencia de bloqueo circular detectada\n 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 No contaminado\n ------------------------------------------------------\n syz-executor.2/13257 est\u00e1 intentando adquirir el bloqueo:\n ffff88801835c0c0 (\u0026delayed_node -\u003e mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256\n\n pero la tarea ya est\u00e1 manteniendo el bloqueo:\n ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198\n\n cuyo bloqueo ya depende del nuevo bloqueo.\n\n la cadena de dependencia existente (en orden inverso) es:\n\n -\u003e #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:\n __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline]\n lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781\n up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625\n btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]\n btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239\n search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline]\n btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230\n btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376\n btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline]\n btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]\n __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111\n __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153\n flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723\n btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078\n process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600\n worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751\n kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389\n ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\n -\u003e #0 (\u0026delayed_node -\u003e mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:\n check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]\n check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]\n validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]\n __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144\n lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761\n __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603\n __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]\n mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799\n __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256\n btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]\n __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156\n btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276\n btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988\n vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]\n vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]\n do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]\n __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]\n __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]\n __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 --TRUNCADO--"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-54224",
"lastModified": "2026-10-28T19:10:00.193",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-30T13:16:10.743",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32247b9526bfdaeef85f7339d9b4f913c7370f92"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36d918da3f1bf749178c7daf471a3be1730ed3ca"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/779c3cf2749c7a7bad6f839cb2954a25ba92f4d6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e110f8911ddb93e6f55da14ccbbe705397b30d0b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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