FKIE_CVE-2023-54216
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-30 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-28 19:10
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: TC, Fix using eswitch mapping in nic mode
Cited patch is using the eswitch object mapping pool while
in nic mode where it isn't initialized. This results in the
trace below [0].
Fix that by using either nic or eswitch object mapping pool
depending if eswitch is enabled or not.
[0]:
[ 826.446057] ==================================================================
[ 826.446729] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.447515] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888194485830 by task tc/6233
[ 826.448243] CPU: 16 PID: 6233 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6+ #1
[ 826.448890] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 826.449785] Call Trace:
[ 826.450052] <TASK>
[ 826.450302] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[ 826.450650] print_report+0xc2/0x610
[ 826.450998] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xb1/0x130
[ 826.451385] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.451935] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[ 826.452276] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.452829] mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.453368] ? __kmalloc_node+0x5a/0x120
[ 826.453733] esw_add_restore_rule+0x20f/0x270 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.454288] ? mlx5_eswitch_add_send_to_vport_meta_rule+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.455011] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0
[ 826.455361] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210
[ 826.455862] ? mapping_add+0x2cb/0x440 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.456425] mlx5e_tc_action_miss_mapping_get+0x139/0x180 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.457058] ? mlx5e_tc_update_skb_nic+0xb0/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.457636] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90
[ 826.458000] ? __kmalloc+0x57/0x120
[ 826.458336] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x325/0xe40 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.458916] ? ct_kernel_enter.constprop.0+0x48/0xa0
[ 826.459360] ? mlx5_tc_ct_parse_action+0xf0/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.459933] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_attach+0x491/0x520 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.460507] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_get+0x12/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.461046] ? mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x154/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.461635] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x969/0x2110 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.462217] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x85/0xe0
[ 826.462597] ? __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x750/0x750 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.463163] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40
[ 826.463534] ? down_read+0x115/0x1b0
[ 826.463878] ? down_write_killable+0x110/0x110
[ 826.464288] ? tc_setup_action.part.0+0x9f/0x3b0
[ 826.464701] ? mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0x4c/0x90 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.465253] ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core]
[ 826.465878] tc_setup_cb_add+0x112/0x250
[ 826.466247] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x230/0x310 [cls_flower]
[ 826.466724] ? fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1a0/0x1a0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.467212] fl_change+0x14e1/0x2030 [cls_flower]
[ 826.467636] ? sock_def_readable+0x89/0x120
[ 826.468019] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.468509] ? kasan_unpoison+0x23/0x50
[ 826.468873] ? get_random_u16+0x180/0x180
[ 826.469244] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2b/0x130
[ 826.469640] ? fl_get+0x7b/0x140 [cls_flower]
[ 826.470042] ? fl_mask_put+0x200/0x200 [cls_flower]
[ 826.470478] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210
[ 826.470973] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]
[ 826.471427] tc_new_tfilter+0x644/0x1050
[ 826.471795] ? tc_get_tfilter+0x860/0x860
[ 826.472170] ? __thaw_task+0x130/0x130
[ 826.472525] ? arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xf0
[ 826.472892] ? cap_capable+0x9f/0xd0
[ 826.473235] ? security_capable+0x47/0x60
[ 826.473608] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1d5/0x550
[ 826.473985] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 826.474383] ? __stack_depot_save+0x35/0x4c0
[ 826.474779] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40
[ 826.475149] ? kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 826.475518] ? __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0
[ 826.475939] ? task_work_add+0x77/0x1c0
[ 826.476305] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210
---truncated---
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4150441c010dec36abc389828e2e4758bd8ad4b3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6702782845a5bf381a19b204c369e63420041665",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dfa1e46d6093831b9d49f0f350227a1d13644a2f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6702782845a5bf381a19b204c369e63420041665",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.3"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.3",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.3.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: TC, Fix using eswitch mapping in nic mode\n\nCited patch is using the eswitch object mapping pool while\nin nic mode where it isn\u0027t initialized. This results in the\ntrace below [0].\n\nFix that by using either nic or eswitch object mapping pool\ndepending if eswitch is enabled or not.\n\n[0]:\n[ 826.446057] ==================================================================\n[ 826.446729] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.447515] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888194485830 by task tc/6233\n\n[ 826.448243] CPU: 16 PID: 6233 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6+ #1\n[ 826.448890] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[ 826.449785] Call Trace:\n[ 826.450052] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 826.450302] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50\n[ 826.450650] print_report+0xc2/0x610\n[ 826.450998] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xb1/0x130\n[ 826.451385] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.451935] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0\n[ 826.452276] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.452829] mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.453368] ? __kmalloc_node+0x5a/0x120\n[ 826.453733] esw_add_restore_rule+0x20f/0x270 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.454288] ? mlx5_eswitch_add_send_to_vport_meta_rule+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.455011] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0\n[ 826.455361] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210\n[ 826.455862] ? mapping_add+0x2cb/0x440 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.456425] mlx5e_tc_action_miss_mapping_get+0x139/0x180 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.457058] ? mlx5e_tc_update_skb_nic+0xb0/0xb0 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.457636] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90\n[ 826.458000] ? __kmalloc+0x57/0x120\n[ 826.458336] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x325/0xe40 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.458916] ? ct_kernel_enter.constprop.0+0x48/0xa0\n[ 826.459360] ? mlx5_tc_ct_parse_action+0xf0/0xf0 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.459933] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_attach+0x491/0x520 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.460507] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_get+0x12/0x20 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.461046] ? mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x154/0x170 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.461635] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x969/0x2110 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.462217] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x85/0xe0\n[ 826.462597] ? __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x750/0x750 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.463163] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40\n[ 826.463534] ? down_read+0x115/0x1b0\n[ 826.463878] ? down_write_killable+0x110/0x110\n[ 826.464288] ? tc_setup_action.part.0+0x9f/0x3b0\n[ 826.464701] ? mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0x4c/0x90 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.465253] ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.465878] tc_setup_cb_add+0x112/0x250\n[ 826.466247] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x230/0x310 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.466724] ? fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1a0/0x1a0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.467212] fl_change+0x14e1/0x2030 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.467636] ? sock_def_readable+0x89/0x120\n[ 826.468019] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.468509] ? kasan_unpoison+0x23/0x50\n[ 826.468873] ? get_random_u16+0x180/0x180\n[ 826.469244] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2b/0x130\n[ 826.469640] ? fl_get+0x7b/0x140 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.470042] ? fl_mask_put+0x200/0x200 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.470478] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210\n[ 826.470973] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.471427] tc_new_tfilter+0x644/0x1050\n[ 826.471795] ? tc_get_tfilter+0x860/0x860\n[ 826.472170] ? __thaw_task+0x130/0x130\n[ 826.472525] ? arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xf0\n[ 826.472892] ? cap_capable+0x9f/0xd0\n[ 826.473235] ? security_capable+0x47/0x60\n[ 826.473608] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1d5/0x550\n[ 826.473985] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[ 826.474383] ? __stack_depot_save+0x35/0x4c0\n[ 826.474779] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40\n[ 826.475149] ? kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n[ 826.475518] ? __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0\n[ 826.475939] ? task_work_add+0x77/0x1c0\n[ 826.476305] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210\n---truncated---"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nnet/mlx5e: TC, Correcci\u00f3n del uso del mapeo de eswitch en modo nic\n\nEl parche citado est\u00e1 utilizando el pool de mapeo de objetos de eswitch mientras est\u00e1 en modo nic donde no est\u00e1 inicializado. Esto resulta en el rastreo a continuaci\u00f3n [0].\n\nCorrija eso utilizando el pool de mapeo de objetos de nic o de eswitch dependiendo de si eswitch est\u00e1 habilitado o no.\n\n[0]:\n[ 826.446057] ==================================================================\n[ 826.446729] BUG: KASAN: slab-uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n in mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.447515] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888194485830 by task tc/6233\n\n[ 826.448243] CPU: 16 PID: 6233 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc6+ #1\n[ 826.448890] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n[ 826.449785] Call Trace:\n[ 826.450052] [TASK]\n[ 826.450302] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50\n[ 826.450650] print_report+0xc2/0x610\n[ 826.450998] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xb1/0x130\n[ 826.451385] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.451935] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0\n[ 826.452276] ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.452829] mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x30/0x490 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.453368] ? __kmalloc_node+0x5a/0x120\n[ 826.453733] esw_add_restore_rule+0x20f/0x270 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.454288] ? mlx5_eswitch_add_send_to_vport_meta_rule+0x260/0x260 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.455011] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0\n[ 826.455361] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210\n[ 826.455862] ? mapping_add+0x2cb/0x440 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.456425] mlx5e_tc_action_miss_mapping_get+0x139/0x180 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.457058] ? mlx5e_tc_update_skb_nic+0xb0/0xb0 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.457636] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90\n[ 826.458000] ? __kmalloc+0x57/0x120\n[ 826.458336] mlx5_tc_ct_flow_offload+0x325/0xe40 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.458916] ? ct_kernel_enter.constprop.0+0x48/0xa0\n[ 826.459360] ? mlx5_tc_ct_parse_action+0xf0/0xf0 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.459933] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_attach+0x491/0x520 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.460507] ? mlx5e_mod_hdr_get+0x12/0x20 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.461046] ? mlx5e_tc_attach_mod_hdr+0x154/0x170 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.461635] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x969/0x2110 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.462217] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x85/0xe0\n[ 826.462597] ? __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x750/0x750 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.463163] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40\n[ 826.463534] ? down_read+0x115/0x1b0\n[ 826.463878] ? down_write_killable+0x110/0x110\n[ 826.464288] ? tc_setup_action.part.0+0x9f/0x3b0\n[ 826.464701] ? mlx5e_is_uplink_rep+0x4c/0x90 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.465253] ? mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work+0x130/0x130 [mlx5_core]\n[ 826.465878] tc_setup_cb_add+0x112/0x250\n[ 826.466247] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x230/0x310 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.466724] ? fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1a0/0x1a0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.467212] fl_change+0x14e1/0x2030 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.467636] ? sock_def_readable+0x89/0x120\n[ 826.468019] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.468509] ? kasan_unpoison+0x23/0x50\n[ 826.468873] ? get_random_u16+0x180/0x180\n[ 826.469244] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2b/0x130\n[ 826.469640] ? fl_get+0x7b/0x140 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.470042] ? fl_mask_put+0x200/0x200 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.470478] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x210/0x210\n[ 826.470973] ? fl_tmplt_create+0x2d0/0x2d0 [cls_flower]\n[ 826.471427] tc_new_tfilter+0x644/0x1050\n[ 826.471795] ? tc_get_tfilter+0x860/0x860\n[ 826.472170] ? __thaw_task+0x130/0x130\n[ 826.472525] ? arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xf0\n[ 826.472892] ? cap_capable+0x9f/0xd0\n[ 826.473235] ? security_capable+0x47/0x60\n[ 826.473608] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1d5/0x550\n[ 826.473985] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0\n[ 826.474383] ? __stack_depot_save+0x35/0x4c0\n[ 826.474779] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2e/0x40\n[ 826.475149] ? kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n[ 826.475518] ? __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9f/0xb0\n[ 826.475939] ? task_work_add+0x77/0x1c0\n[ 826.476305] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-54216",
"lastModified": "2026-10-28T19:10:00.193",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-30T13:16:09.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4150441c010dec36abc389828e2e4758bd8ad4b3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfa1e46d6093831b9d49f0f350227a1d13644a2f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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