FKIE_CVE-2023-54164
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-30 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-15 22:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e969bfed84c1f88dc722a678ee08488e86f0ec1a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c524f9561c657b8af26dd4f67092b8928261aa62",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "88ad50f2b843a510bd7c922c0a4e2484aff9d645",
"status": "affected",
"version": "241f51931c35085449502c10f64fb3ecd6e02171",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d40ae85ee62e3666f45bc61864b22121346f88ef",
"status": "affected",
"version": "241f51931c35085449502c10f64fb3ecd6e02171",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2539cbc625c560d5432e2f0fc04bfe4a889cf737",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1.42",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.9",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/iso.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.4.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.4.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.5",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: fix iso_conn related locking and validity issues\n\nsk-\u003esk_state indicates whether iso_pi(sk)-\u003econn is valid. Operations\nthat check/update sk_state and access conn should hold lock_sock,\notherwise they can race.\n\nThe order of taking locks is hci_dev_lock \u003e lock_sock \u003e iso_conn_lock,\nwhich is how it is in connect/disconnect_cfm -\u003e iso_conn_del -\u003e\niso_chan_del.\n\nFix locking in iso_connect_cis/bis and sendmsg/recvmsg to take lock_sock\naround updating sk_state and conn.\n\niso_conn_del must not occur during iso_connect_cis/bis, as it frees the\niso_conn. Hold hdev-\u003elock longer to prevent that.\n\nThis should not reintroduce the issue fixed in commit 241f51931c35\n(\"Bluetooth: ISO: Avoid circular locking dependency\"), since the we\nacquire locks in order. We retain the fix in iso_sock_connect to release\nlock_sock before iso_connect_* acquires hdev-\u003elock.\n\nSimilarly for commit 6a5ad251b7cd (\"Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible\ncircular locking dependency\"). We retain the fix in iso_conn_ready to\nnot acquire iso_conn_lock before lock_sock.\n\niso_conn_add shall return iso_conn with valid hcon. Make it so also when\nreusing an old CIS connection waiting for disconnect timeout (see\n__iso_sock_close where conn-\u003ehcon is set to NULL).\n\nTrace with iso_conn_del after iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis:\n===============================================================\niso_sock_create:771: sock 00000000be9b69b7\niso_sock_init:693: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_bind:827: sk 000000004dff667e 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 type 1\niso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_setsockopt:1289: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_connect:875: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_connect_cis:353: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -\u003e 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da\nhci_get_route:1199: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -\u003e 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da\nhci_conn_add:1005: hci0 dst 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da\niso_conn_add:140: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e\n__iso_chan_add:214: conn 00000000daf8625e\niso_connect_cfm:1700: hcon 000000007b65d182 bdaddr 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da status 12\niso_conn_del:187: hcon 000000007b65d182 conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16\niso_sock_clear_timer:117: sock 000000004dff667e state 3\n \u003cNote: sk_state is BT_BOUND (3), so iso_connect_cis is still\n running at this point\u003e\niso_chan_del:153: sk 000000004dff667e, conn 00000000daf8625e, err 16\nhci_conn_del:1151: hci0 hcon 000000007b65d182 handle 65535\nhci_conn_unlink:1102: hci0: hcon 000000007b65d182\nhci_chan_list_flush:2780: hcon 000000007b65d182\niso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_getsockopt:1376: sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_getname:1070: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e\niso_sock_shutdown:1434: sock 00000000be9b69b7, sk 000000004dff667e, how 1\n__iso_sock_close:632: sk 000000004dff667e state 5 socket 00000000be9b69b7\n \u003cNote: sk_state is BT_CONNECT (5), even though iso_chan_del sets\n BT_CLOSED (6). Only iso_connect_cis sets it to BT_CONNECT, so it\n must be that iso_chan_del occurred between iso_chan_add and end of\n iso_connect_cis.\u003e\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\nPGD 8000000006467067 P4D 8000000006467067 PUD 3f5f067 PMD 0\nOops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:__iso_sock_close (net/bluetooth/iso.c:664) bluetooth\n===============================================================\n\nTrace with iso_conn_del before iso_chan_add in iso_connect_cis:\n===============================================================\niso_connect_cis:356: 70:1a:b8:98:ff:a2 -\u003e 28:3d:c2:4a:7e:da\n...\niso_conn_add:140: hcon 0000000093bc551f conn 00000000768ae504\nhci_dev_put:1487: hci0 orig refcnt 21\nhci_event_packet:7607: hci0: e\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-54164",
"lastModified": "2026-10-15T22:17:53.947",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.0,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2023-54164",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-15T21:38:48.372109Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-12-30T13:16:04.167",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88ad50f2b843a510bd7c922c0a4e2484aff9d645"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d40ae85ee62e3666f45bc61864b22121346f88ef"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e969bfed84c1f88dc722a678ee08488e86f0ec1a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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