FKIE_CVE-2023-54155
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-24 13:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:46| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a09c258cfa77d3ba0a7acc555c73eb6b005c4bd8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "43b5169d8355ccf26d726fbc75f083b2429113e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "20acffcdc2b74fb7dcc4e299f7aca173df89d911",
"status": "affected",
"version": "43b5169d8355ccf26d726fbc75f083b2429113e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d9252d67ed2f921c230bba449ee051b5c32e4841",
"status": "affected",
"version": "43b5169d8355ccf26d726fbc75f083b2429113e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d14eea09edf427fa36bd446f4a3271f99164202f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "43b5169d8355ccf26d726fbc75f083b2429113e4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.127",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.46",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.4.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.4.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.5",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: core: remove unnecessary frame_sz check in bpf_xdp_adjust_tail()\n\nSyzkaller reported the following issue:\n=======================================\nToo BIG xdp-\u003eframe_sz = 131072\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5020 at net/core/filter.c:4121\n ____bpf_xdp_adjust_tail net/core/filter.c:4121 [inline]\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5020 at net/core/filter.c:4121\n bpf_xdp_adjust_tail+0x466/0xa10 net/core/filter.c:4103\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n bpf_prog_4add87e5301a4105+0x1a/0x1c\n __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:600 [inline]\n bpf_prog_run_xdp include/linux/filter.h:775 [inline]\n bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp+0x57e/0x11e0 net/core/dev.c:4721\n netif_receive_generic_xdp net/core/dev.c:4807 [inline]\n do_xdp_generic+0x35c/0x770 net/core/dev.c:4866\n tun_get_user+0x2340/0x3ca0 drivers/net/tun.c:1919\n tun_chr_write_iter+0xe8/0x210 drivers/net/tun.c:2043\n call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1871 [inline]\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x650/0xe40 fs/read_write.c:584\n ksys_write+0x12f/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n\nxdp-\u003eframe_sz \u003e PAGE_SIZE check was introduced in commit c8741e2bfe87\n(\"xdp: Allow bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() to grow packet size\"). But Jesper\nDangaard Brouer \u003cjbrouer@redhat.com\u003e noted that after introducing the\nxdp_init_buff() which all XDP driver use - it\u0027s safe to remove this\ncheck. The original intend was to catch cases where XDP drivers have\nnot been updated to use xdp.frame_sz, but that is not longer a concern\n(since xdp_init_buff).\n\nRunning the initial syzkaller repro it was discovered that the\ncontiguous physical memory allocation is used for both xdp paths in\ntun_get_user(), e.g. tun_build_skb() and tun_alloc_skb(). It was also\nstated by Jesper Dangaard Brouer \u003cjbrouer@redhat.com\u003e that XDP can\nwork on higher order pages, as long as this is contiguous physical\nmemory (e.g. a page)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-54155",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:46:54.133",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-24T13:16:17.510",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20acffcdc2b74fb7dcc4e299f7aca173df89d911"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a09c258cfa77d3ba0a7acc555c73eb6b005c4bd8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d14eea09edf427fa36bd446f4a3271f99164202f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9252d67ed2f921c230bba449ee051b5c32e4841"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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