FKIE_CVE-2023-53829

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-09 16:17 - Updated: 2026-08-04 10:19
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted Let's flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty inode during eviction in this call stack: f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs] f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs] f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs] ? sugov_start+0x140/0x140 evict+0xc3/0x1c0 evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210 generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120 kill_block_super+0x21/0x50 deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90 cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160 task_work_run+0x59/0x90 do_exit+0x33b/0xa50 do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd This triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode: f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)); This fixes the syzbot report: loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869 Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000 R13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665 dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698 evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748 generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478 kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417 kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704 deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330 deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361 cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874 do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df. RSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09 RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40 R10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869 Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd <0f> 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000 ---truncated---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c64dbe8fa3552a340bca6d7fa09468c16ed2a85
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3ab55746612247ce3dcaac6de66f5ffc055b9df
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfa7853bb47fee0c17030b377c98cf4ede47ba33
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/f2fs/segment.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1c64dbe8fa3552a340bca6d7fa09468c16ed2a85",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bfa7853bb47fee0c17030b377c98cf4ede47ba33",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a3ab55746612247ce3dcaac6de66f5ffc055b9df",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/f2fs/segment.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.8"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.8",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.54",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.5.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: flush inode if atomic file is aborted\n\nLet\u0027s flush the inode being aborted atomic operation to avoid stale dirty\ninode during eviction in this call stack:\n\n  f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x22/0x40 [f2fs]\n  f2fs_abort_atomic_write+0xc4/0xf0 [f2fs]\n  f2fs_evict_inode+0x3f/0x690 [f2fs]\n  ? sugov_start+0x140/0x140\n  evict+0xc3/0x1c0\n  evict_inodes+0x17b/0x210\n  generic_shutdown_super+0x32/0x120\n  kill_block_super+0x21/0x50\n  deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x90\n  cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160\n  task_work_run+0x59/0x90\n  do_exit+0x33b/0xa50\n  do_group_exit+0x2d/0x80\n  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x14/0x20\n  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\n\nThis triggers f2fs_bug_on() in f2fs_evict_inode:\n f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE));\n\nThis fixes the syzbot report:\n\nloop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072\nF2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value\nF2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint\nF2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:869!\ninvalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN\nCPU: 0 PID: 5014 Comm: syz-executor220 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-11479-g6cd06ab12d1a #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869\nCode: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd \u003c0f\u003e 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: ffff8880273b8000 RSI: ffffffff83a2bd0d RDI: 0000000000000007\nRBP: ffff888077db91b0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888029a3c000\nR13: ffff888077db9660 R14: ffff888029a3c0b8 R15: ffff888077db9c50\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f1909bb9000 CR3: 00000000276a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:665\n dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:698\n evict_inodes+0x345/0x440 fs/inode.c:748\n generic_shutdown_super+0xaf/0x480 fs/super.c:478\n kill_block_super+0x64/0xb0 fs/super.c:1417\n kill_f2fs_super+0x2af/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4704\n deactivate_locked_super+0x98/0x160 fs/super.c:330\n deactivate_super+0xb1/0xd0 fs/super.c:361\n cleanup_mnt+0x2ae/0x3d0 fs/namespace.c:1254\n task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179\n exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]\n do_exit+0xa9a/0x29a0 kernel/exit.c:874\n do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1024\n __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline]\n __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1033 [inline]\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1033\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd\nRIP: 0033:0x7f309be71a09\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f309be719df.\nRSP: 002b:00007fff171df518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f309bef7330 RCX: 00007f309be71a09\nRDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 00007f309bef1e40\nR10: 0000000000010600 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f309bef7330\nR13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\nModules linked in:\n---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x172d/0x1e00 fs/f2fs/inode.c:869\nCode: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6a 06 00 00 8b 75 40 ba 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 6d ce 06 00 e9 aa fc ff ff e8 63 22 e2 fd \u003c0f\u003e 0b e8 5c 22 e2 fd 48 c7 c0 a8 3a 18 8d 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90003a6fa00 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000\n---truncated---"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53829",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-04T10:19:23.433",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-12-09T16:17:21.790",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c64dbe8fa3552a340bca6d7fa09468c16ed2a85"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3ab55746612247ce3dcaac6de66f5ffc055b9df"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfa7853bb47fee0c17030b377c98cf4ede47ba33"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}



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