FKIE_CVE-2023-53760

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-08 02:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:46
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: mcq: Fix &hwq->cq_lock deadlock issue When ufshcd_err_handler() is executed, CQ event interrupt can enter waiting for the same lock. This can happen in ufshcd_handle_mcq_cq_events() and also in ufs_mtk_mcq_intr(). The following warning message will be generated when &hwq->cq_lock is used in IRQ context with IRQ enabled. Use ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock() with spin_lock_irqsave instead of spin_lock to resolve the deadlock issue. [name:lockdep&]WARNING: inconsistent lock state [name:lockdep&]-------------------------------- [name:lockdep&]inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. [name:lockdep&]kworker/u16:4/260 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: ffffff8028444600 (&hwq->cq_lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0 [name:lockdep&]{IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x17c/0x33c _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0x7c ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0 ufs_mtk_mcq_intr+0x60/0x1bc [ufs_mediatek_mod] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x140/0x3ec handle_irq_event+0x50/0xd8 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x148/0x2b0 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x4c/0x6c gic_handle_irq+0x58/0x134 call_on_irq_stack+0x40/0x74 do_interrupt_handler+0x84/0xe4 el1_interrupt+0x3c/0x78 <snip> Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&hwq->cq_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&hwq->cq_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/u16:4/260: [name:lockdep&] stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 260 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Tainted: G S W OE 6.1.17-mainline-android14-2-g277223301adb #1 Workqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x10c/0x160 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xd8 dump_stack+0x20/0x60 print_usage_bug+0x584/0x76c mark_lock_irq+0x488/0x510 mark_lock+0x1ec/0x25c __lock_acquire+0x4d8/0xffc lock_acquire+0x17c/0x33c _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0x7c ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0 ufshcd_poll+0x68/0x1b0 ufshcd_transfer_req_compl+0x9c/0xc8 ufshcd_err_handler+0x3bc/0xea0 process_one_work+0x2f4/0x7e8 worker_thread+0x234/0x450 kthread+0x110/0x134 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ce8c49c7b53e0a2258b833eeab16a6d78f732d1
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/948afc69615167a3c82430f99bfd046332b89912
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/ufs/core/ufs-mcq.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2ce8c49c7b53e0a2258b833eeab16a6d78f732d1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed975065c31c2a0372e13c19e8140b69814a98ba",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "948afc69615167a3c82430f99bfd046332b89912",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ed975065c31c2a0372e13c19e8140b69814a98ba",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/ufs/core/ufs-mcq.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.3"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.3",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.3.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.3.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.4",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: ufs: core: mcq: Fix \u0026hwq-\u003ecq_lock deadlock issue\n\nWhen ufshcd_err_handler() is executed, CQ event interrupt can enter waiting\nfor the same lock. This can happen in ufshcd_handle_mcq_cq_events() and\nalso in ufs_mtk_mcq_intr(). The following warning message will be generated\nwhen \u0026hwq-\u003ecq_lock is used in IRQ context with IRQ enabled. Use\nufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock() with spin_lock_irqsave instead of spin_lock to\nresolve the deadlock issue.\n\n[name:lockdep\u0026]WARNING: inconsistent lock state\n[name:lockdep\u0026]--------------------------------\n[name:lockdep\u0026]inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -\u003e {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage.\n[name:lockdep\u0026]kworker/u16:4/260 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:\n  ffffff8028444600 (\u0026hwq-\u003ecq_lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at:\nufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0\n[name:lockdep\u0026]{IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at:\n  lock_acquire+0x17c/0x33c\n  _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0x7c\n  ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0\n  ufs_mtk_mcq_intr+0x60/0x1bc [ufs_mediatek_mod]\n  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x140/0x3ec\n  handle_irq_event+0x50/0xd8\n  handle_fasteoi_irq+0x148/0x2b0\n  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x4c/0x6c\n  gic_handle_irq+0x58/0x134\n  call_on_irq_stack+0x40/0x74\n  do_interrupt_handler+0x84/0xe4\n  el1_interrupt+0x3c/0x78\n\u003csnip\u003e\n\nPossible unsafe locking scenario:\n       CPU0\n       ----\n  lock(\u0026hwq-\u003ecq_lock);\n  \u003cInterrupt\u003e\n    lock(\u0026hwq-\u003ecq_lock);\n  *** DEADLOCK ***\n2 locks held by kworker/u16:4/260:\n\n[name:lockdep\u0026]\n stack backtrace:\nCPU: 7 PID: 260 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Tainted: G S      W  OE\n6.1.17-mainline-android14-2-g277223301adb #1\nWorkqueue: ufs_eh_wq_0 ufshcd_err_handler\n\n Call trace:\n  dump_backtrace+0x10c/0x160\n  show_stack+0x20/0x30\n  dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xd8\n  dump_stack+0x20/0x60\n  print_usage_bug+0x584/0x76c\n  mark_lock_irq+0x488/0x510\n  mark_lock+0x1ec/0x25c\n  __lock_acquire+0x4d8/0xffc\n  lock_acquire+0x17c/0x33c\n  _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0x7c\n  ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x30/0xe0\n  ufshcd_poll+0x68/0x1b0\n  ufshcd_transfer_req_compl+0x9c/0xc8\n  ufshcd_err_handler+0x3bc/0xea0\n  process_one_work+0x2f4/0x7e8\n  worker_thread+0x234/0x450\n  kthread+0x110/0x134\n  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53760",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:46:01.333",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-08T02:15:51.783",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ce8c49c7b53e0a2258b833eeab16a6d78f732d1"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/948afc69615167a3c82430f99bfd046332b89912"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}



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