FKIE_CVE-2023-53461
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-01 12:15 - Updated: 2026-11-05 21:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: wait interruptibly for request completions on exit
WHen the ring exits, cleanup is done and the final cancelation and
waiting on completions is done by io_ring_exit_work. That function is
invoked by kworker, which doesn't take any signals. Because of that, it
doesn't really matter if we wait for completions in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
or TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state. However, it does matter to the hung task
detection checker!
Normally we expect cancelations and completions to happen rather
quickly. Some test cases, however, will exit the ring and park the
owning task stopped (eg via SIGSTOP). If the owning task needs to run
task_work to complete requests, then io_ring_exit_work won't make any
progress until the task is runnable again. Hence io_ring_exit_work can
trigger the hung task detection, which is particularly problematic if
panic-on-hung-task is enabled.
As the ring exit doesn't take signals to begin with, have it wait
interruptibly rather than uninterruptibly. io_uring has a separate
stuck-exit warning that triggers independently anyway, so we're not
really missing anything by making this switch.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/io_uring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "28e649dc9947e6525c95e32aa9a8e147925e3f56",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b188cc1bb857a9d4701ae59aa7768b5124e262e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8e29835366138389bfad3b31ea06960d0a77bf77",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b188cc1bb857a9d4701ae59aa7768b5124e262e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b50d6e06cca7b67a3d73ca660dda27662b76e6ea",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b188cc1bb857a9d4701ae59aa7768b5124e262e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "58e80cb68b057e974768792c34708c6957810486",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b188cc1bb857a9d4701ae59aa7768b5124e262e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4826c59453b3b4677d6bf72814e7ababdea86949",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b188cc1bb857a9d4701ae59aa7768b5124e262e",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/io_uring.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.121",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.39",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.4.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.4.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.5",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7923F5AF-D195-4700-991C-9E8460759C6F",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.188",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EC77775B-EC31-4966-966C-1286C02B2A85",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.121",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "9BD1D4A1-304D-4187-8178-6D7C0050B1AF",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.39",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A91BC267-63EE-413E-A6EF-6B96C2A278D1",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.4.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring: wait interruptibly for request completions on exit\n\nWHen the ring exits, cleanup is done and the final cancelation and\nwaiting on completions is done by io_ring_exit_work. That function is\ninvoked by kworker, which doesn\u0027t take any signals. Because of that, it\ndoesn\u0027t really matter if we wait for completions in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE\nor TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state. However, it does matter to the hung task\ndetection checker!\n\nNormally we expect cancelations and completions to happen rather\nquickly. Some test cases, however, will exit the ring and park the\nowning task stopped (eg via SIGSTOP). If the owning task needs to run\ntask_work to complete requests, then io_ring_exit_work won\u0027t make any\nprogress until the task is runnable again. Hence io_ring_exit_work can\ntrigger the hung task detection, which is particularly problematic if\npanic-on-hung-task is enabled.\n\nAs the ring exit doesn\u0027t take signals to begin with, have it wait\ninterruptibly rather than uninterruptibly. io_uring has a separate\nstuck-exit warning that triggers independently anyway, so we\u0027re not\nreally missing anything by making this switch."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-53461",
"lastModified": "2026-11-05T21:17:21.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2023-53461",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-05T20:21:28.770575Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-10-01T12:15:47.723",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28e649dc9947e6525c95e32aa9a8e147925e3f56"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4826c59453b3b4677d6bf72814e7ababdea86949"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58e80cb68b057e974768792c34708c6957810486"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e29835366138389bfad3b31ea06960d0a77bf77"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b50d6e06cca7b67a3d73ca660dda27662b76e6ea"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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