FKIE_CVE-2023-51451
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2023-12-22 21:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:404.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| sentry | symbolicator | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "symbolicator",
"vendor": "getsentry",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.3.3, \u003c 23.12.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:sentry:symbolicator:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "90A1A7B2-A187-4B37-B3DD-301CC6441B55",
"versionEndExcluding": "23.12.1",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.3.3",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Symbolicator is a service used in Sentry. Starting in Symbolicator version 0.3.3 and prior to version 21.12.1, an attacker could make Symbolicator send GET HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs with internal IP addresses by using an invalid protocol. The responses of those requests could be exposed via Symbolicator\u0027s API. In affected Sentry instances, the data could be exposed through the Sentry API and user interface if the attacker has a registered account. The issue has been fixed in Symbolicator release 23.12.1, Sentry self-hosted release 23.12.1, and has already been mitigated on sentry.io on December 18, 2023. If updating is not possible, some other mitigations are available. One may disable JS processing by toggling the option `Allow JavaScript Source Fetching` in `Organization Settings \u003e Security \u0026 Privacy` and/or disable all untrusted public repositories under `Project Settings \u003e Debug Files`. Alternatively, if JavaScript and native symbolication are not required, disable Symbolicator completely in `config.yml`."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Symbolicator es un servicio utilizado en Sentry. A partir de la versi\u00f3n 0.3.3 de Symbolicator y antes de la versi\u00f3n 21.12.1, un atacante podr\u00eda hacer que Symbolicator enviara solicitudes HTTP GET a URL arbitrarias con direcciones IP internas mediante el uso de un protocolo no v\u00e1lido. Las respuestas a esas solicitudes podr\u00edan exponerse a trav\u00e9s de la API de Symbolicator. En las instancias de Sentry afectadas, los datos podr\u00edan quedar expuestos a trav\u00e9s de la API de Sentry y la interfaz de usuario si el atacante tiene una cuenta registrada. El problema se solucion\u00f3 en la versi\u00f3n 23.12.1 de Symbolicator, la versi\u00f3n 23.12.1 autohospedada de Sentry y ya se mitig\u00f3 en sentry.io el 18 de diciembre de 2023. Si no es posible actualizar, hay otras mitigaciones disponibles. Se puede deshabilitar el procesamiento de JS activando la opci\u00f3n \"Allow JavaScript Source Fetching\" en \"Organization Settings \u0026gt; Security \u0026amp; Privacy\" y/o deshabilitar todos los repositorios p\u00fablicos que no sean de confianza en \"Project Settings \u0026gt; Debug Files\". Alternativamente, si no se requieren JavaScript ni la simbolizaci\u00f3n nativa, desactive Symbolicator por completo en `config.yml`."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-51451",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:40:59.207",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2023-12-22T21:15:09.297",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/self-hosted/releases/tag/23.12.1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/pull/1343"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/releases/tag/23.12.1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/security/advisories/GHSA-ghg9-7m82-h96r"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/self-hosted/releases/tag/23.12.1"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/pull/1343"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/releases/tag/23.12.1"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/symbolicator/security/advisories/GHSA-ghg9-7m82-h96r"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.