FKIE_CVE-2023-46841

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-03-20 11:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:31
Severity
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks", holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.
References
security@xen.orghttps://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZON4TLXG7TG4A2XZG563JMVTGQW4SF3A/Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
security@xen.orghttps://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-451.htmlPatch, Vendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-451.htmlPatch, Vendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HES2IJXZY3H7HBPP4NVSVYYNGW254DMI/
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZON4TLXG7TG4A2XZG563JMVTGQW4SF3A/Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-451.htmlPatch, Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
fedoraproject fedora 40
xen xen *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "Xen",
          "vendor": "Xen",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "unknown",
              "version": "consult Xen advisory XSA-451"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@xen.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:40:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "CA277A6C-83EC-4536-9125-97B84C4FAF59",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:xen:xen:*:*:*:*:*:*:x86:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "73CA7EB6-4464-4294-B859-0C8DD3AB7E86",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.14.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement\nTechnology (CET).  A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS).\nCET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented\nProgramming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data\nand return addresses are accompanied by so called \"shadow stacks\",\nholding little more than return addresses.  Shadow stacks aren\u0027t\nwritable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their\ncontents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address\ncoming from the traditional stack.\n\nIn particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen.  In\nvarious cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of\nthe instruction.  Such replaying typically involves filling and then\ninvoking of a stub.  Such a replayed instruction may raise an\nexceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly.\n\nUnfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn\u0027t right:\nRecovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack.\nThe counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Las CPU x86 recientes ofrecen una funcionalidad denominada Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Una subcaracter\u00edstica de esto son Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS es una caracter\u00edstica de hardware manipulada para proteger contra ataques de programaci\u00f3n orientada al retorno. Cuando est\u00e1n habilitadas, las pilas tradicionales que contienen datos y direcciones de retorno van acompa\u00f1adas de las llamadas \"pilas ocultas\", que contienen poco m\u00e1s que direcciones de retorno. Las pilas de sombra no se pueden escribir mediante instrucciones normales y, cuando la funci\u00f3n regresa, su contenido se usa para verificar una posible manipulaci\u00f3n de una direcci\u00f3n de retorno proveniente de la pila tradicional. En particular, ciertos accesos a la memoria necesitan ser interceptados por Xen. En varios casos, la emulaci\u00f3n necesaria implica una especie de repetici\u00f3n de la instrucci\u00f3n. Esta reproducci\u00f3n normalmente implica llenar y luego invocar un trozo. Una instrucci\u00f3n repetida de este tipo puede generar excepciones, lo cual se espera y se trata en consecuencia. Desafortunadamente, la interacci\u00f3n de los dos anteriores no fue correcta: la recuperaci\u00f3n implica la eliminaci\u00f3n de un marco de llamada de la pila (tradicional). Faltaba la contraparte de esta operaci\u00f3n para la pila de sombra."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-46841",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:31:44.437",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2023-46841",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-03-25T16:09:38.636466Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-03-20T11:15:08.220",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@xen.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZON4TLXG7TG4A2XZG563JMVTGQW4SF3A/"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@xen.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-451.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-451.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HES2IJXZY3H7HBPP4NVSVYYNGW254DMI/"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZON4TLXG7TG4A2XZG563JMVTGQW4SF3A/"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-451.html"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@xen.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NVD-CWE-Other"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.