FKIE_CVE-2023-38292

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-04-22 15:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:09
Summary
Certain software builds for the TCL 20XE Android device contain a vulnerable, pre-installed app with a package name of com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy (versionCode='2', versionName='v11.0.1.0.0201.0') that allows local third-party apps to programmatically perform a factory reset due to inadequate access control. No permissions or special privileges are necessary to exploit the vulnerability in the com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy app. No user interaction is required beyond installing and running a third-party app. The software build fingerprints for each confirmed vulnerable build are as follows: TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB7I-0:user/release-keys and TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB83-0:user/release-keys. This malicious app sends a broadcast intent to the exported com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy/.rtn.FactoryResetReceiver receiver component, which initiates a programmatic factory reset.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org"
    },
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:h:tcl:20xe:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "product": "20xe",
          "vendor": "tcl",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "-"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Certain software builds for the TCL 20XE Android device contain a vulnerable, pre-installed app with a package name of com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy (versionCode=\u00272\u0027, versionName=\u0027v11.0.1.0.0201.0\u0027) that allows local third-party apps to programmatically perform a factory reset due to inadequate access control. No permissions or special privileges are necessary to exploit the vulnerability in the com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy app. No user interaction is required beyond installing and running a third-party app. The software build fingerprints for each confirmed vulnerable build are as follows: TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB7I-0:user/release-keys and TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB83-0:user/release-keys. This malicious app sends a broadcast intent to the exported com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy/.rtn.FactoryResetReceiver receiver component, which initiates a programmatic factory reset."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Ciertas versiones de software para el dispositivo Android TCL 20XE contienen una aplicaci\u00f3n vulnerable preinstalada con un nombre de paquete com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy (versionCode=\u00272\u0027, versionName=\u0027v11.0.1.0.0201.0\u0027) que permite aplicaciones locales de terceros para realizar mediante programaci\u00f3n un restablecimiento de f\u00e1brica debido a un control de acceso inadecuado. No se necesitan permisos ni privilegios especiales para explotar la vulnerabilidad en la aplicaci\u00f3n com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy. No se requiere ninguna interacci\u00f3n del usuario m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de instalar y ejecutar una aplicaci\u00f3n de terceros. Las huellas digitales de compilaci\u00f3n de software para cada compilaci\u00f3n vulnerable confirmada son las siguientes: TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB7I-0:user/release-keys and TCL/5087Z_BO/Doha_TMO:11/RP1A.200720.011/PB83-0:user/release-keys. Esta aplicaci\u00f3n maliciosa env\u00eda una intenci\u00f3n de transmisi\u00f3n al componente receptor exportado com.tct.gcs.hiddenmenuproxy/.rtn.FactoryResetReceiver, que inicia un restablecimiento de f\u00e1brica program\u00e1tico."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-38292",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:09:49.677",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 5.8,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2023-38292",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-04-22T19:14:08.484673Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-04-22T15:15:46.763",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2031/DEF%20CON%2031%20presentations/Ryan%20Johnson%20Mohamed%20Elsabagh%20Angelos%20Stavrou%20-%20Still%20Vulnerable%20Out%20of%20the%20Box%20Revisiting%20the%20Security%20of%20Prepaid%20Android%20Carrier%20Devices.pdf"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2031/DEF%20CON%2031%20presentations/Ryan%20Johnson%20Mohamed%20Elsabagh%20Angelos%20Stavrou%20-%20Still%20Vulnerable%20Out%20of%20the%20Box%20Revisiting%20the%20Security%20of%20Prepaid%20Android%20Carrier%20Devices.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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