FKIE_CVE-2023-34243

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2023-06-08 22:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 06:03
Summary
TGstation is a toolset to manage production BYOND servers. In affected versions if a Windows user was registered in tgstation-server (TGS), an attacker could discover their username by brute-forcing the login endpoint with an invalid password. When a valid Windows logon was found, a distinct response would be generated. This issue has been addressed in version 5.12.5. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may be mitigated by rate-limiting API calls with software that sits in front of TGS in the HTTP pipeline such as fail2ban.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
tgstation13 tgstation-server *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "tgstation-server",
          "vendor": "tgstation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 5.12.5"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:tgstation13:tgstation-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "39BA735D-72FE-487B-88D4-7E6E2FBF1E39",
              "versionEndExcluding": "5.12.5",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "TGstation is a toolset to manage production BYOND servers. In affected versions if a Windows user was registered in tgstation-server (TGS), an attacker could discover their username by brute-forcing the login endpoint with an invalid password. When a valid Windows logon was found, a distinct response would be generated. This issue has been addressed in version 5.12.5. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may be mitigated by rate-limiting API calls with software that sits in front of TGS in the HTTP pipeline such as fail2ban."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "TGstation es un conjunto de herramientas para gestionar servidores BYOND de producci\u00f3n. En las versiones afectadas, si un usuario de Windows estaba registrado en \"tgstation-server (TGS)\", un atacante pod\u00eda descubrir su nombre de usuario forzando el endpoint de inicio de sesi\u00f3n con una contrase\u00f1a no v\u00e1lida. Cuando se encontraba un inicio de sesi\u00f3n de Windows v\u00e1lido, se generaba una respuesta distinta. Este problema se ha solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 5.12.5. Se recomienda a los usuarios que la actualicen. Los usuarios que no puedan actualizar pueden mitigar el problema limitando la velocidad de las llamadas a la API con un software que se sit\u00fae delante de TGS en el canal HTTP, como por ejemplo fail2ban. "
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-34243",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T06:03:12.497",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2023-34243",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2025-01-06T19:27:12.277382Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2023-06-08T22:15:09.437",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/pull/1526"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w3jx-4x93-76ph"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/pull/1526"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w3jx-4x93-76ph"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    },
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-307"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.