FKIE_CVE-2022-50735
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-24 13:16 - Updated: 2026-11-10 12:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "69346de0eb956fb92949b9473de4647d9c34a54f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9daf27e62852d68c6ffc2c21090238ea51bb0a7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "58fdd84a89b121b761dbfb8a196356e007376ca4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9daf27e62852d68c6ffc2c21090238ea51bb0a7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f5ac749a0b21beee55d87d0b05de36976b22dff9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9daf27e62852d68c6ffc2c21090238ea51bb0a7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bd5dac7ced5a7c9faa4dc468ac9560c3256df845",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9daf27e62852d68c6ffc2c21090238ea51bb0a7f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.86",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.0.16",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: do not run mt76u_status_worker if the device is not running\n\nFix the following NULL pointer dereference avoiding to run\nmt76u_status_worker thread if the device is not running yet.\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range\n[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\nCPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #78 Hardware\nname: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\nrel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data\nRIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0\nCode: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00\n48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 \u003c0f\u003e\nb6\n04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a\nRBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c\nR10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8\nR13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x1d2/0xeb0\n mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x8e/0xd0\n mt76u_tx_status_data+0xe1/0x240\n process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460\n worker_thread+0x95/0xe00\n kthread+0x3a1/0x480\n ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\nModules linked in:\n--[ end trace 8df5d20fc5040f65 ]--\nRIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0\nCode: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00\n48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 \u003c0f\u003e\nb6\n04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a\nRBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c\nR10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8\nR13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\n\nMoreover move stat_work schedule out of the for loop."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nwifi: mt76: no ejecutar mt76u_status_worker si el dispositivo no est\u00e1 en ejecuci\u00f3n\n\nCorrige la siguiente desreferencia de puntero NULL evitando ejecutar el hilo mt76u_status_worker si el dispositivo a\u00fan no est\u00e1 en ejecuci\u00f3n.\n\nKASAN: desreferencia de puntero nulo en el rango\n[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\nCPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: kworker/u2:2 No contaminado 5.14.0+ #78 Nombre del hardware: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\nrel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nCola de trabajo: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data\nRIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0\nC\u00f3digo: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00\n48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 [0f]\nb6\n04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a\nRBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c\nR10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8\nR13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\nTraza de llamadas:\nmt76x02_send_tx_status+0x1d2/0xeb0\nmt76x02_tx_status_data+0x8e/0xd0\nmt76u_tx_status_data+0xe1/0x240\nprocess_one_work+0x92b/0x1460\nworker_thread+0x95/0xe00\nkthread+0x3a1/0x480\nret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\nM\u00f3dulos enlazados:\n--[ fin de la traza 8df5d20fc5040f65 ]--\nRIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0\nC\u00f3digo: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00\n48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 [0f]\nb6\n04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a\nRBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c\nR10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8\nR13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000)\nknlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\n\nAdem\u00e1s, mover la programaci\u00f3n de stat_work fuera del bucle for."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-50735",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T12:10:00.177",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-24T13:16:00.187",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58fdd84a89b121b761dbfb8a196356e007376ca4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69346de0eb956fb92949b9473de4647d9c34a54f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd5dac7ced5a7c9faa4dc468ac9560c3256df845"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5ac749a0b21beee55d87d0b05de36976b22dff9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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